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ABSTRACT
Shingo Takahashi: Essays on Executive Compensation
(Under the direction of Thomas Mroz)
Chapter 1 provides empirical evidence of the effect of stock options and total
compensation on the job turnover of corporate Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Our
estimates indicate that both the amount and the composition of the compensation pack-
age are significant determinants of turnover probability. Holding the total amount of
compensation constant, an increase in the proportion of stock options in the total com-
pensation from its median level (0.48) to the 75th percentile level (0.67), would result
in a decrease in annual turnover probability from 16 percent to 13.5 percent. On the
other hand, holding the proportion of stock options constant, if the total compensation
increases from the median level ($2.5 million) to the 75 percentile level ($5 million),
turnover probability would decrease to 14 percent. In Chapter 2 we develop a model to
describe the relationship between incentive and tenure in a principal-agent setting. One
of the standard results of principal agent theories is that pay-for-performance sensitivity
increases with the agent’s tenure, but this has been rejected by prior empirical studies
in CEO compensation literature. In our model, uncertainty dictates if the principal
iii
chooses input-based compensation or output-based compensation, where input-based
compensation is less incentive intensive. We show that the principal is more likely to
choose input-based compensation later in the agent’s tenure. This demonstrates that
pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases with the agent’s tenure -result consistent with
the prior empirical findings in the CEO compensation literature. Chapter 3 reexamines
the relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity and tenure using CEO com-
pensation data. Our estimates indicate that there is a strong and positive relationship
between pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO tenure. For CEOs with tenure less
than or equal to six years, an improvement in firm performance from the median level
to the 75th percentile level would only lead to a 0.06 percent increase in total compen-
sation. For CEOs with tenure of seven years or more, the same improvement in firm
performance would lead to an 8 percent increase in total compensation. Our new find-
ings strongly support standard principal-agent theories, but do not support our model
in Chapter 2.
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Chapter I
The Structure of Compensation and CEO Job Turnover
1 Introduction
CEO compensation has been explained commonly by the principal agent theory, where
the shareholders of the firm are the principal and the CEO is the agent. Past empirical
studies have mainly focused on the effect of firm performance on either compensation
or on turnover probability. However, none of the prior literature investigated the rela-
tionship between compensation and turnover probability.
When investigating the compensation vs. turnover relationship, we consider not
only the amount but also the form of the compensation package. Since 1990, we have
seen an unprecedented increase in the use of stock options as part of CEO compensation.
A possible effect of the increased use of stock options on turnover probability has been
implied by some researchers (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran, 2000), but we know
almost nothing about the actual statistical impact. This is the motivation of this study:
to document the relationship between compensation and turnover behavior of CEOs.
The form of compensation is represented by the proportion of stock options in the total
compensation package.
Investigating the effect of the form of compensation on CEO turnover is also inter-
esting on theoretical grounds since stock options can be seen as deferred compensation;
Standard option pricing theory implies that option holders would wait to exercise
until the strike date in order to maximize their profit. Moreover, stock options granted to
CEOs usually have vesting period of about three years and un-vested options are usually
forfeited if the CEOs leave their firms. One implication of deferred compensation is that
it reduces turnover probability since it provides an incentive for CEOs to remain at the
firm longer.
The contributions of my study are fourfold. (1) This study provides new empirical
evidence about the link between the form of CEO compensation and CEO turnover
probability, (2) documents the effect of total compensation on CEO turnover probability,
(3) proposes a reasonable choice of instrumental variables to cope with the endogeneity
problem which arises in estimating such relationships and (4) estimates the relationships
between turnover and total amount and the form of compensation using a joint system
of equations that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity, which deals with endogeneity
issues most efficiently.
We find that both the amount and the form of total compensation have significant
effects on CEO turnover probability. Turnover probability for our median CEO is 16%.
An increase in the proportion of options in total compensation from the median level to
the 75 percentile level (an increase in the proportion from 0.47 to 0.68) would decrease
the turnover probability from 16% to 13.5%, while an increase in the amount of total
compensation from the median level to the 75 percentile level, which is an increase from
$2 million to $4 million, would decrease turnover probability from 16% to 14.0%. Thus,
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if the probability of separation were constant over time, the expected number of years
that CEOs would hold office would increase by 19 percent (6.2 years to 7.9 years) when
the proportion of options increases from the median level to the 75 percentile level, while
it would increases by 14% (6.2 years to 7.4 years) when total compensation increases
from the median level to the 75 percentile level, holding the proportion of deferred
compensation constant.
Prior empirical work regarding the incentive effect of stock options customarily
investigated how total compensation is tied to firm performance where options are simply
added to total compensation (for example, Hall and Liebman, 2000). However, this
approach ignores the particular characteristics of options as deferred compensation. Our
estimated negative relationship between the form of compensation and CEO turnover
probability provides fresh evidence that stock options are used as deferred compensation
to provide incentives for CEOs to strive longer, binding CEOs to their firms.
Additionally, our study finds that, although changes in firm performance have a rel-
atively small effect on the turnover probability, the turnover related pay-for-performance
sensitivity is greater than the comparable figure estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990,
A). We find that the median CEOs with 4 years of experience would lose 56.9 cents for
each $1000 lost by shareholders. This is larger than a comparable Jensen and Murphy’s
figure by a factor of 7.(Jensen and Murphy estimated that CEOs would lose 8.6 cents
for each $1000 lost by shareholders.) This difference mainly stems from the fact that
our estimated turnover probability is much higher than that of Jensen and Murphy’s.
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Jensen and Murphy’s estimated turnover probability is 4.6 percent for CEOs whose age
is 53 years old while our comparable estimate is 16 percent. Jensen and Murphy’s small
estimate may be partly because they did not exclude the left censored observations which
would have biased their estimate downwards. It could also be that their estimate was
contaminated with a similar problem with age variables that we found in ExecuComp
data set. 1
Finally, our study finds little support for managerial entrenchment hypothesis through
interlocking directorship. The presence of interlocking directorship did not appear to
have a negative effect on turnover probability for CEOs whose tenure is less than 10
years after controlling for biases due to left censoring (or the interrupted spells biases).
We only find a negative effect of interlocking directorship when the sample contains left
censored observations. However, since we do not find a negative effect when we eliminate
the left censored observations, we are not able to tell if such negative effect is due to a
true interlocking directorship effect.
2 Theories and prior empirical studies
This section summarizes several existing theories and the prior empirical studies that de-
scribe CEO compensation. First I outline the principal agent theory, second managerial
entrenchment and skimming theories, and third the matching theory.
1Age is missing for more than 70% of the observations. Now, divide the sample into two sub-sample,
one for non-missing age, and the other for missing age. Then, the average exit rate for the first sub-
sample is about 0.019 while the average exit rate is 0.13. Therefore, restricting the sample to the
observations for non-missing age variable produces unrealistically low turnover rate.
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2.1 Principal agent theory and prior empirical work
CEO compensation has been commonly explained by principal agent theories, where the
shareholders of the firm are the principal and the CEO is the agent. Since ownership is
separated from management in public corporations, asymmetries of information occur
between the CEO and the shareholders. This leads the principal to form a contract
with the CEO as a way of directing the CEO’s actions towards their interests. Prior
theoretical work has studied many types of contracts. The greater part of the literature
on CEO compensation has been devoted to testing the pay-for-performance contract.
However, another type of contract, the “deferred compensation contract” seems particu-
larly informative about some aspects of CEO compensation, especially the stock option
component of CEO pay. In this section, I briefly outline the theory and empirical work
on “deferred compensation” followed by a summary of the theory and empirical work
concerning pay-for-performance contracts.
Deferred compensation : If a CEO remains with a firm for an extended period
of time, it does not imply that the firm will pay the CEO his/her marginal product
every period of time. For example, suppose the CEO exerts effort, e , which takes only
two values , 0 or 1. e=0 is interpreted as shirking and e = 1 interpreted as the CEO
exerting effort. Assume the CEO incurs the cost of making effort equal to c/2 only when
he or she exerts an effort. If the CEO shirks, he or she will be caught shirking with
probability equal to p. The maximum penalty associated with being caught shirking is
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zero compensation. Then, the firm should pay at least w∗ = c/(2p) in order to induce
CEO to exert effort (Prendergast, 1999, P44). This wage entails a rent equal to (1−p)c
2p
.
Now suppose that the CEO works for two periods. Let δ be the discount factor. Then
it is not necessary for the firm to pay the CEO w∗ for both periods. In fact, it can be
shown the contract such that the firm pays the CEO w∗ = (1−p)c
2p
in the second period
and pays the CEO w1 >
2
2p
− δ(1−p)c
2p
in the first period would induce effort in both
periods. This means that rent associated with the first year is set strictly less than the
rent associated with second period. Intuitively, this offer induces effort in both periods
since, if the CEO is caught shirking in the first period, the CEO is fired, therefore loses
not only the rent associated with first period wage, but also the future rent which is set
greater than the first year rent.
By providing greater rent in the second period, the firm effectively keeps the CEO
exerting an effort in both periods, thus providing a longer term incentive. This feature is
particulary attractive to firms since firms may want to motivate their CEOs in order to
align the CEOs’ interests with the firms’ long run profits (Eaton and Rosen, 1983). For
example, suppose that the firm has old equipment which should be replaced. Without
a long run incentive, the CEOs may keep the old equipment in order to make a large
profit one year, and take that record as an advertisement to get a job elsewhere (Eaton
and Rosen, 1983).
Notice that stock options can be seen as deferred compensation. A standard option
pricing theory predicts that it is better for the option holders to wait to exercise the
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stock option until the strike date in order to maximize their profit. Although some
evidence of early exercises have been reported (Hemmer, Matsunaga, Shevlin, 1996),
giving stock options certainly creates an incentive for the CEO to remain longer. This is
combined with the fact that stock options granted to CEOs usually have vesting periods
of about three years. Since un-vested options are forfeited if CEOs leave their positions,
this creates additional incentive for CEOs to strive longer.
One implication is that the greater use of deferred compensation binds CEOs to their
firms. However, there is no prior literature investigating the relationship between the use
of stock options and the turnover probability. The closest study would be Eaton and
Rosen (1983) that considers stock options as a deferred compensation to bind CEOs
to the firm. They used the proportion of stock options in the total compensation to
represent the form of compensation. However, their empirical study focuses on what
determines the form of compensation, not the relationship between the form of com-
pensation and turnover probability. This omission becomes one of our motivations to
document the relationship between the form of compensation and turnover probability.
Pay-for-performance contract : The pay-for-performance contract ties the CEOs’
performance with compensation and it is the most standard result from principal-agent
theory. The most straightforward empirical test for the principal agent theory is to
estimate the pay for performance sensitivity. Jensen and Murphy (1990, A) estimated
the following equation, ∆(Salary + Bonus)t = a + b∆(Shareholders
′wealth)t where
b is interpreted as the pay for performance sensitivity and ∆ denotes the first differ-
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ence. They find that a $1000 increase in shareholders’ wealth will increase CEO annual
compensation only by 2.2 cents.
We can understand the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in the context of pay
for performance sensitivity if we view turnover as zero compensation. Jensen and Mur-
phy’s estimates (1990, A) suggest that the annual turnover probability of a CEO whose
age is 53 would increase from 4.6% to 5.7% if the firm’s net market return deteriorates
from 0% to -50%. They show that, due to such an increase in turnover probability,
the CEO would lose 8.6 cents for each $1000 lost by shareholders. They concluded that
such pay-for-performance sensitivity is too weak to be consistent with the principal agent
theory.
Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that the small pay for performance sensitivity in
Jensen and Murphy (1990, A) is due to the fact that Jensen and Murphy’s compensation
measure does not incorporate stock option holdings. Instead, Hall and Liebman define
the CEOs’ wealth as the summation of salary, bonus and stock holdings. Their estimate
suggests that, if the firm’s performance improves from the 10 percentile level to the
median level, the CEO’s wealth would increase by as much as $7.6 million.
2.2 Managerial entrenchment and skimming
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis asserts that the separation of ownership and
management gives CEOs effective control of the compensation determination process.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that under the managerial entrenchment hy-
pothesis, CEO pay level is constrained by the unwillingness of CEOs to draw share-
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holder’s attention (p, 902). Under the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, performance
due to observable luck may be rewarded. On the other hand, under a simple principal
agent hypothesis, rewarding the CEO for observable luck will not give him/her any in-
centive, and therefore paying for luck cannot be the optimal contract for the principal.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) use several measures for observable luck, such as an
increase in oil prices, and show that CEO compensation is sensitive to lucky dollars as
much as general dollars. Further, they find that such tendency is weaker for less en-
trenched CEOs (indicated by the presence of block-shareholders). They conclude that
CEO compensation is better explained by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
The studies of managerial entrenchment summarized above mainly focus on the
effect on compensation. It is also reasonable to assume that CEOs also have a motivation
to entrench themselves from the threat of dismissal. My study also investigates the
relationship between managerial entrenchment and turnover probability by investigating
the effect of interlocking directorship to see if entrenchment through an interlocking
directorship would reduce CEO turnover. 2 We use a dummy variable for interlocking
directorship as a proxy for managerial entrenchment.
2.3 Matching theory
Although the matching theory is not often used to describe CEO compensation, it is
one of the few theories that directly relates compensation and turnover probability.
2Interlocking directorship can be best described by the following situation. Suppose “CEO A”
previously served as a member of a board for “CEO B” who is in a different firm. Oftentimes, we can
find a situation where “CEO B” later serves as a member of the board for “CEO A”. This can create
close personal connections between CEO A and the member of the board (CEO B).
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Jovanovic (1979) is one of the most prominent papers that contributed to the matching
theory. One distinguishing feature of the matching theory is that uncertainty exits both
for CEOs and shareholders. The productivity of the CEO depends on the match between
the CEO and the firm: Exact information about the match is not perfectly observed by
both parties.
A simple form of the matching model is the following. In the beginning of the period,
the manager and the firm jointly draw a match parameter θ, assumed N(0, σ20). The
output of the firm at period t is given by yt = θ + ut where ut is a noise term, assumed
N(0, σ2u) and independent of θ. The match between the manager and the firm can only
be inferred by observing the output which includes the noise term. By observing the
output repeatedly over time, however, the assessment about the match becomes more
precise. For each period, the wage offer to the CEO is assumed to be its conditional
expected output level, E(yt|y1, . . . , yt−1). After the offer is made to the CEO, he or she
decides whether or not to take this offer. If he/she does not take the offer, he/she quits
and finds a new match.
The implications of matching theory are, (i) the probability of subsequent turnover
is negatively correlated with the current wage rate, (ii) turnover probability increases
with the riskiness of the environment σ2u, (iii) wage rises with tenure and (iv) turnover
probability is negatively correlated with tenure.
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2.4 Summary of the implications
First, the literature on deferred compensation suggests that the greater use of stock
options in total compensation would reduce turnover probability. Pay-for-performance
contract literature predicts that turnover probability is negatively related to firm per-
formance. Third, the managerial entrenchment hypotheses implies that an increase in
the extent of managerial entrenchment reduces the turnover probability. Lastly, the
matching theory predicts that turnover probability decreases with the amount of com-
pensation, increases with the riskiness of the environment and decreases with tenure.
This discussion suggests that my empirical work should incorporate variables such as
the returns to shareholders to proxy for the firm’s performance as well as the measures
to control for these possible influences. My choice of variables is described in more detail
in Section 5.
3 Trend in CEO compensation
Our primary data sources are ExecuComp and Compustat published by Standard and
Poors. ExecuComp covers detailed information about the five most highly paid execu-
tives in each company within the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600
firms. My study focuses on compensation only of CEOs. The sample covers the years
1993 to 2003. All the compensation figures in my study are deflated by the Consumer
Price Index, with year 2003 as the base year. Most of the important variables are from
ExecComp, except the data on R&D spending and dividend payout which are from
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Compustat.
We define total compensation as the sum of salary, bonus and the ex ante value of
stock options. The value of stock options is calculated using the Black Sholes stock price
formula. These three elements are chosen since they constitute the largest part of CEO
compensation. They make up of nearly 90% of the whole CEO compensation package
for all the sample years.
The yearly average of total compensation is seen in Table 1. The increase from 1993
to 2000 is rather dramatic. The average total compensation in 1993 is $1.93 million.
This figure nearly quadrupled to $6.66 million in year 2000. However, average total
compensation declined after year 2000. In fact, this is the year in which the information
technology industry stock “bubble” burst. Table 2 shows the yearly averages for the three
components separately. As can be seen, the value of stock options increases substantially
to reach a peak in year 2000 and then declines sharply. Both salary and bonus show
modest but steady increases through the whole sample period.
It is evident from Table 2 that the composition of compensation packages has
changed significantly; the importance of stock option grants has increased dramatically.
To see this more clearly, I calculate the “option mix” defined as stock option
total compensation
. Table 3
shows yearly averages of the option mix. Option mix increases from about 0.3 in 1993 to
about 0.5 in year 2001. This figure declines after 2001, however, with the mix of option
in year 2004 still at 0.42.
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4 Data description
Due to the 1992 requirement by the SEC, ExecuComp data contain a detailed breakdown
of CEO compensation, including salary, bonuses, restricted stock grants and the Black-
Sholes value of stock options. This makes ExecuComp a more attractive data set than
alternative sources such as the Executive Compensation Survey published by Forbes;
Forbes data does not contain stock option information.
4.1 Sample criteria
We treat each CEO-firm combination as a unique CEO. We also require that each
individual became a CEO on or after year 1993, the year our sample period began, so
that that there are no left censored observations in our sample. This is the requirement
that distinguishes our sample from most of the prior studies about CEO turnover. To
our knowledge, most of the studies about CEO turnover do not explicitly address the
problem associated with left censoring, presumably including CEOs whose tenure started
before their sample period. As is well known, such inclusion of left censored observation
causes biases in the estimates. A more detailed description of our sample criteria can
be found in Appendix A.
After eliminating observations that do not match our sample criteria, we obtain an
unbalanced panel data set that contain 5350 CEO-years of observation including 1221
corporations and 1625 CEOs from 1993 to 2003.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 shows the median amounts of salary, bonus, stock option and total compensation
for the sample that passed our criteria. The median values are computed by CEO tenure.
CEO tenure is the length of time a CEO holds office within a specific firm. All three
components of total compensation show an increasing trend. The median level of salary
is $0.5 million in the first year of tenure, increasing to $0.855 million at the 10th year
of tenure. Bonus appears to be the smallest component. Median CEOs receive about
$0.3 million in the first year, which increases to $0.8 million 10 years later. Stock option
is unarguably the largest component of total compensation. The median CEO receives
about $0.93 million worth of stock options in the first year of their tenure, and this
increases to $1.56 million at the 10th year of tenure.
The median level of total compensation shows a steady upward trend in the first 10
years of CEO tenure. The median CEO receives total compensation of about $2 million
dollars in the first year, increasing as much as 90% in the next 10 years. The option
mix does not show an obvious trend, as can be seen from Table 4. The median level of
option mix in the first year is 0.51, hovering between 0.45 and 0.5 through our sample
period. The option mix trend shows that CEOs receive a considerable portion of total
compensation in the form of stock options for the first 10 years of their tenure. This
means that the amount that CEOs would forfeit when they are dismissed is fairly high.
Needless to say, the benefits of stock options are realized only if the stock price increases.
Therefore, a CEO compensation package with such a high option mix bears significant
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risk.
5 Models
Our primary objective is to document the relationship between turnover probability and
the amount of compensation, and the relationship between turnover probability and the
“form” of compensation. The form of compensation is represented by the proportion of
stock options in total compensation. In this section we propose three different models
to estimate such a relationship.
Model 1 is a simple Panel data logit discrete hazard model with the dependent
variable equal to zero if the CEO does not leave after the end of the financial year, and
equal to one if the CEO leaves after the end of the financial year. Model 2 and Model 3
deal with the possible endogeneity in total compensation and option mix by estimating
a joint system of equations. Model 2 estimates the system of equations using a two stage
method. The problem with endogeneity arises because of the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity which causes correlations among the error terms in the system of equations.
In Model 3, we explicitly incorporate a time invariant unobserved heterogeneity term in
the system and estimate the coefficients using a maximum likelihood method.
5.1 Model 1: Basic Model-Panel Data logit discrete hazard
model
Model 1 is a single equation panel data logit discrete hazard model written as,
yit = β0 + β1log(Total compensation)it
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+ β2(Option mix)it + Z
′
itβ + µit
such that if
yit ≥ 0 then leave the firm at the end of year t
yit < 0 then stay in the firm for the next year.
i indexes each CEO and t indexes the year. Total compensation is defined as the sum of
annual salary, bonuses and stock options. Option mix is computed as Options
Total compensation
.
µit is an error term that is assumed standard logistic. In order to compute robust
standard errors for the estimates of coefficients, I allow possible correlation among error
terms within the same CEO. Nonetheless, error terms are assumed to be independent
across different CEOs. Zit is the vector of variables that directly affects the turnover
probability, but not correlated with the error term µit.
There are some reasons to believe that total compensation and option mix are
endogenous variables. Therefore, applying a simple logit model may result in biased
estimates. This leads to considering a joint system of equations. Model 2 deals with the
endogeneity by a two stage method. Model 3 deals with endogeneity by incorporating a
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity term in the system.
5.2 Model 2: Two stage instrumental variable estimation to
deal with endogeneity
Compensation may be set according to the firm’s performance and may be determined
endogenously. As for the form of compensation, many researchers report that firms may
determines the form of compensation based on“investment opportunity sets,” such as
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the market to book asset ratio. (i.g., Gaver and Garver,1993). Details of such discussions
along with possible factors that affect total compensation and option mix are presented
in section 6.
To deal with endogeneity, we consider the following system of equations.
Turnover equation : yit = β0 + β1log(Total compensation)it
+β2(Option mix)it + Z
′
itβ + µit (1)
Compensation equation : log(Total compensation)it = α0 +X
′
itα+ ε
comp
it (2)
Option mix equation : (Option mix)it = γ0 +X
′
itγ + ε
mix
it (3)
Zit in equation (1) is the vector of variables that directly affect turnover probability.
Xit is the vector of variables that affect the compensation and option mix. ε
comp
it is
assumed normal with the mean equal to zero and variance equal to σcomp. εmixit is also
assumed normal with mean zero and variance σmix. We continue to assume that µit
follows standard logistic. However, we do not assume that those errors terms, µit, ε
comp
it
and εmixit , are independent.
Estimating the turnover equation is our main goal. The simplest way to estimate
the equation is by a two-stage-method. First, we estimate compensation and option
mix equations using Ordinary Least Square. Then we replace the compensation and
option mix in the turnover equation with their predicted values. I refer to the total
compensation and option mix equations as the first stage equations.
Appropriateness of the two stage method depends on the correlation between µ and
εComp, and a correlation between µ and εmix. If there is no correlation, then estimating
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the turnover equation with simple logit regression without the two stage method is more
appropriate. This may be unlikely, however, due to the presence of unobservable vari-
ables that affect both the turnover equation and the first stage equations. For example,
there may be an unobservable variable that characterizes the riskiness of the environ-
ment in which the firm operates. This variable is likely to increase total compensation
(Garen, 1994), and at the same time, increase turnover probability, causing a positive
correlation between µ and εcomp. If we do not take care of endogeneity, such a positive
correlation between error terms causes upward bias in the estimated coefficient for total
compensation. The two stage method allows for both time invariant heterogeneity, and
time varying heterogeneity that causes contemporaneous errors to be correlated.
To our knowledge, there has been no prior research examining the relationship be-
tween turnover probability and compensation. Therefore, there are no agreed upon
instruments. Moreover, our second stage regression (turnover equation), involves a lim-
ited dependent variable which requires logit regression. The finite sample performance
of the two stage method of this kind is studied by Bollen, Guilky and Mroz (1995).
They provide researchers with simple ways to test the validity of instruments, along
with other practical guidance for effective application of such two stage methods. The
following summarizes their suggestions.
Irrelevance test for excluded variable : As for identification, the X variables in the
first stage equations should contain at least one variable that is excluded from Z variables
in the turnover equation. Relevance of the excluded variables should be tested. This
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is done by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the excluded variables in
the first stage equations are jointly equal to zero. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis,
using two stage method would simply add noises in the second stage and thus, it is more
appropriate to estimate a single turnover equation without the two stage method.
Test for over-identification : Over-identifying restrictions should be tested, i.e.,
the excluded variables should influence the turnover equation only through the first
stage equations. A simple test that is the following: (i) replace total compensation
and option mix in the turnover equation with their predicted values and (ii) put the
“excluded” variables (instruments) in the turnover equation, then estimate the turnover
equation using logit regression. If our exclusion restrictions are valid, the coefficients for
instruments will be jointly close to zero, in which case, we say that we fail to reject the
over-identification test.3
Exogeneity test : Whether these suspected endogenous explanatory variables are
indeed endogenous should be tested since taking care of endogeneity when it is actually
exogenous is costly in terms of precision. The simplest test is to put the predicted
errors of the first stage equations in the turnover equation (without replacing total
compensation and option mix with their predicted values) and estimate the turnover
equation using logit regression. If the variables are actually exogenous, the coefficients
of the predicted errors will be close to zero. If the coefficients are jointly NOT close to
3Note that we cannot put all the excluded variables in the turnover equation since this causes perfect
multi-collinearity: If we have k excluded variables, we only put in k-2 variables. Therefore, if the model
is exactly identified, we cannot test the validity of the instruments.
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zero, we reject the exogeneity hypothesis.
We summarize the choice of explanatory variables along with the rationale for the
choice of exclusion restrictions in section 6. It should be noted here that we include
a number of lagged variables in the explanatory variable which makes it difficult to
use CEOs who leave at the end of the first year since some lagged variables are not
attainable for such CEOs. Therefore, the two stage method uses only individuals who
stayed at least two years in the firm. This could cause a potential selection bias. Model
3 addresses one way to correct for such selection bias as well as dealing with endogeneity.
5.3 Model 3: Heterogeneity model
The problem associated with endogeneity arises from the correlation among error terms.
The previous section dealt with this problem using a two stage method. Yet, another
method is to incorporate an unobserved explanatory variable. Let χi be the unobserved
explanatory variable for individual i. This term summarizes all the time invariant un-
observed heterogeneity not captured by the observed explanatory variables. Therefore,
our heterogeneity model is written as
Turnover equation : yit = β0 + β1log(Total compensation)it
+β2(Option mix)it + Z
′
itβ + ρ1χi + µit (4)
Compensation equation : log(Total compensation)it = α0 +X
′
itα
+ρ2χi + ε
comp
it (5)
Option mix equation : (Option mix)it = γ0 +X
′
itγ + ρ3χi + ε
mix
it (6)
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where ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 are the factor loads. χi is assumed standard normal. ε
comp
it and
εmixit are assumed normal with mean zero, and variances σ
comp and σmix respectively.
We continue to assume that µit are standard logistic. However, unlike the two stage
method, we assume that those error terms are independent. We also assume that χi
is independent of the error terms. Therefore, we have, εcompit ⊥ εmixit ⊥ µit ⊥ χi. In
other words, the correlation in residuals are captured by χi when ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 are not
all equal to zero. This method differs from Model 2 in that it only deals with time
invariant heterogeneity and does not allow for time varying heterogeneity that causes
contemporaneous errors to be correlated.
As stated in the previous section, Model 2 (the two stage method) uses only indi-
viduals who survived for at least two years, and hence drops individuals who left at the
end of the first year. This causes a potential selection bias. To deal with such a selection
problem, we incorporate a selection equation which is described as,
Selection equation : Iiti = θ0 +W
′
iti
θ + ρ4χi + µ
initial
iti
(7)
such that if
Iiti ≥ 0 then leave the firm at the end of first year
Iiti < 0 then stay in the firm in the next period
where ti is the year in which the individual became a CEO. Iiti is the latent variable such
that if it is greater than 0, the CEO exits in the first year, and if it is smaller than zero,
the CEO stays in the firm. Witi is a set of exogenous variables that directly affect the
initial year turnover. The ρ4χi term controls for the possibility of self-selection bias in
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year 2 and later. Therefore, our heterogeneity model becomes a system of four equations
(4), (5), (6) and (7). Again, we assume that µinitit are independent from all other error
terms.
If all the equations were linear, our model would be a standard multi-equation
random effect model. However, turnover equation and selection equation are non-linear.
Therefore, we estimate the system in the following way. Let Ti be the year in which
individual i exit the firm. If individual did not exit the firm during the sample period,
Ti = 2003, and this individual is said to be right censored. Again ti is the year in
which an individual became a CEO. Let Dexitit be the dummy variable which equals one
if individual i exits at year t and zero otherwise. Let Dinititi be the dummy variable which
equals one if individual i exits at the end of the first year of his or her tenure.
Since all the error terms, µi, ε
comp
i , ε
mix
i and µ
init
iti
are independent conditional on χi,
individual i’s likelihood contribution is written as,
Li(Φ|χi) =
Ti∏
t = ti+1
{[1− logit(Z˜ ′itβ˜ + ρ1χi)]D
exit
it [logit(Z˜
′
itβ˜ + ρ1χi)]
1−Dexitit
× φ(log(Total compensation)it − Z˜ ′itα˜− ρ2χi, σcomp)
× φ((Option mix)it − Z˜ ′itγ˜ − ρ3χi, σmix)}
× [1− logit(W˜ ′iti θ˜ + ρ4χi)]D
init
iti [logit(W˜
′
iti
θ˜ + ρ4χi)]
1−Dinititi (8)
where
logit(v) =
ev
1 + ev
φ(v, σ) =
1√
2piσ
exp(− v
2
2σ2
)
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The term, Z˜
′
itβ˜, represents the observable part of equation (4). Other terms with a tilde
have the same meaning. Φ is the union of all the coefficients to be estimated. To obtain
the unconditional likelihood, we integrate out χi. Unconditional likelihood contribution
of individual i is give by,
Li(Φ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Li(Φ|v) 1√
2pi
exp(−v
2
2
)dv (9)
Unfortunately, we do not have a closed form for this. Therefore, we approximate Li(Φ)
using the Gauss-Hermite approximation with 10 mass points.
Li(Φ) ≈ L˜i(Φ) =
10∑
k=1
wkLi(Φ|vk) (10)
where the weights wk and the support point vk are chosen using 10 points Gauss-Hermite
formula.
Let N be the number of individuals in the sample. We maximize the following
likelihood function over Φ to obtain the estimated coefficients.
L(Φ) =
N∏
i=1
L˜i(Φ) (11)
6 Choice of explanatory variables
This section briefly outlines our choice of explanatory variables along with our choice
of excluded variables. We only describe selected variables. Table 5 is the list of our
choice of explanatory variables. Detailed definitions for those variables can be found
in Appendix A. First, we describe the choice of Z variables - the variables that are
included in the turnover equation. Second, we describe the variables that affect total
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compensation and option mix. Third, we provide the rationale for the choice of our
excluded variables. The excluded variables may be referred to as instruments. We use
the terms instruments and excluded variables interchangeably.
6.1 Choice of Z variables: variables that directly affect turnover
Existing theories summarized in section 2 suggest that factors such as firm performance,
managerial entrenchment, CEO tenure and riskiness of the environment in which the
firm operates directly affect CEO turnover probability. In empirical work, it is necessary
to find variables to proxy for those factors.
We use the following three variables to proxy for firm performance: (i) returns to
shareholders, (ii) natural log of market to book asset ratio, and (iii) yearly percentage
change in sales. The use of the market to book asset ratio requires some explanation.
The book value of assets can be viewed as assets already in place, while a positive
difference between market value and book value can be viewed as assets which will be
in place in the future. A greater market to book asset ratio is a proxy for growth
opportunity. Therefore, the market to book asset ratio can be seen as one indicator of
firm performance.
Following Garen (1994) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) I use the R&D ratio
(computed as R&D
Book value of assets
) and stock price volatility to proxy for the riskiness of
the environment in which the firm operates. In addition, I use a dummy variable for
observations with no R&D expenditure 4. Many firms have no such expenditure, and
4ExecuComp reports a number of R&D observations as missing. My study assumed that whenever
R&D figure is missing, R&D = 0 . I believe that such assumption is reasonable and would not bias my
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there may be a systematic difference between firms that make R&D expenditures and
firms that do not.
We do not use an age variable. We found that the age variable in ExecuComp
(p age 2) is problematic in two ways. First, age is missing for more than 70% of the
observations. Second, when we divide the sample into two sub-samples, one for ob-
servations whose age variable is not missing, and the other for observations whose age
variable is missing, the average turnover rate for the sub-sample whose age variable is
not missing is 0.019, whereas the average turnover rate for the sub-sample whose age
variable is missing is 0.13. Therefore, incorporating age variable produces extremely
small and unrealistic turnover rate. In fact, our preliminary work restricted the sample
to only those with an observable age measure, leading to an unrealistically low median
turnover rate of 0.026.
6.2 Variables that affect total compensation and option mix:
Some existing theories suggest that total compensation is influenced by factors such
as firm performance, managerial entrenchment and CEO tenure. The inclusion of the
industry average total compensation stems from the idea that when the board decides
the compensation level, it may consider how its peer firms are paying their CEOs. It is
also important to consider the timing at which compensation is determined. Typically,
salary and stock option grants are determined at the beginning of the financial year,
whereas bonuses are determined during the financial year. Therefore, it is likely that
estimates as many missing observation are from such industries as apparel or food industry, which are
not usually considered R&D intensive industry
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salary and stock options depend more on the variables of the previous period. For this
reason, I incorporate lags of those variables.
As for the determinants of option mix, much research suggests that a firm’s “growth
opportunities” may affect the composition of its CEO’s compensation. Such research
argues that as growth opportunities increase, the observability of managerial action
decreases, increasing information asymmetry between management and shareholders.
Using market based incentive plans can reduce the agency cost associated with infor-
mation asymmetry. Therefore, we expect a higher proportion of stock options in total
compensation for firms with abundant growth opportunities.
Common variables to proxy for growth opportunities are market to book asset ratio
(Myers, 1977), R&D to book value of asset ratio (Gaver and Gaver, 1993) and percentage
change in sales (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran, 2000). Dividend yield is used as the
inverse indicator of growth opportunities (Anderson et al, 2000). The use of dividend
yield is because growth firms tend to have greater amounts of investment expenditure
and hence, lower dividend payout (Anderson et al, 2000).
6.3 Choice of excluded variables
Whether a variable can be excluded from the turnover equation is a matter of degree.
Ideally, we want to find variables that affect the turnover equation only through the
total compensation and option mix. In reality, such variables may be difficult to find.
However, some variables may affect compensation and option mix very strongly while
affecting y in the turnover equation very weakly. Such a variable may be used as an
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excluded variables. Our choice of excluded variables are listed in Table 5. Notice that
X variables are the union of all the excluded variables and the variables that directly
affect turnover.
First, note that many of the lagged variables are used as excluded variables. Con-
sider for example, exclusion of the lag of the interlocking directorship dummy. It is
reasonable to assume that previous years’ interlocking directorship has a weaker impact
on determining whether the CEO is to be retained next year. One can imagine an ex-
treme situation where, there was a member of the board with interlocking directorship
in the previous year, but that person is out this year. If such is the case, it is difficult
for this person to have influence over the CEO retention decision or CEO compensation
during this year.
Other lagged variables are in the excluded category. This is due to my assumption
that the current variables summarize most of the relevant information about the past.
In particular, we assume that the board of directors mostly uses current information for
their CEO retention decision. Therefore, I used lagged variables as excluded variables.
Dividend yield is used as an excluded variable. This is due to the fact that, by con-
struction, the returns to shareholders contain dividend information, and therefore, the
dividend information is already included in the turnover equation. I validate the choice
of excluded variables via the statistical test described in section 5.2.
Finally, the choice of the variable for the selection equation (W variables) is pre-
sented in Table 5. Table 6 is the summary statistics of our main explanatory variables.
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7 Main empirical results
This section summarizes our empirical results. First, we presents the estimates of se-
lected variables for the three models. Second, we detail the effects of the amount and the
composition of the CEO compensation on turnover probability. Third, we present the
estimated effect of interlocking directorship on the turnover probability. Finally, using
the estimated turnover probability, we compute the pay-for-performance sensitivity due
to the threat of dismissal.
7.1 Estimation results across the models
Table 8 presents the estimated coefficients for selected variables for Model 1, the single
turnover equation model, and Model 3, the heterogeneity model. We do not report Model
2 since we fail to reject Mode 1 in favor of Model 2. We failed to reject the exogeneity of
total compensation and option mix, as can be seen in Table 10, even if our instruments
are valid: The excluded variables appear to be significant determinants of both total
compensation and option mix, as seen in Table 9. The excluded variables also appear
to be valid instruments as is shown in Table 10. However, both total compensation
and option mix do not appear to be endogenous, as can be seen from Table 10. Our
instruments include variables such as the lagged value of R&D ratio, dividend yield, and
industry average of option mix, which are reported in Table 5.
Model 1 is nested with Model 3 given the restriction that four factor loads are zero.
The χ2 test of the restriction, however, rejected the hypothesis. Thus, we focus on Model
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3 as being the most relevant. Notice, however, that the significant effect of heterogeneity
only comes from the covariance between total compensation, option mix and the initial
selection equations as can be seen from Table 8. There appears to be no correlation with
the error terms in the turnover equation. In fact, the estimates for the turnover equation
for Model 3 are never substantially different from Model 1. The estimated coefficients
for total compensation is -0.176 for Model 1 while it is -0.246 for Model 3. Therefore,
the estimated coefficient for total compensation increases by 40% in magnitude when
we choose the heterogeneity model.5 The estimated coefficient for option mix is -0.937
for Model 1 while it is -1.032 for Model 3; the coefficient increases by 10% in magnitude
when we choose the heterogeneity model.
7.2 The effect of the amount and the structure of compensation
on CEO job turnover
In this section, we report the relationship between estimated turnover probability and
total compensation, and the relationship between the turnover probability and option
mix. To interpret the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in an informative way, we
first define our “median” CEO at his or her fourth year of tenure. This is reported in
the third column of Table 11. These are the median values for our explanatory variables
for CEOs at their fourth year of tenure. Our median CEO has a total compensation of
about $2.52 million, with an option mix equal to 0.476. The second and fourth columns
5Since the variance of composite error term ρ1χi+µit = ρ21+pi
2/3, more appropriately, we multiply
the coefficients for Model 3 by
√
pi2/3
pi2/3+ρ21
= 0.997 to compare coefficients across the model. As can be
seen, this does not make a big difference.
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of Table 11 report 25 percentile and 75 percentile values for those variables for the CEOs
at their fourth year of tenure.
Having defined the median CEOs, we compute the change in turnover probability
when a particular variable changes from the median level to the 75 percentile or to the 25
percentile, holding all other variables constant. Table 12 reports the changes in turnover
probability based on Model 3, the heterogeneity model. Upon computing the logit of
leaving, we have integrated out the heterogeneity term.
Our median CEO has a turnover probability of 0.16. An increase in total compen-
sation from the medial level to the 75 percentile level would reduce turnover probability
to 0.14, while a decrease in total compensation to the 25 percentile level would increase
turnover probability to 0.184. The negative relationship between total compensation
and turnover probability is consistent with the matching theory.
A change in option mix also appears to have a sizable effect on turnover probability:
an increase in option mix from the median level to its 75 percentile level would reduce
turnover probability from 0.16 to 0.135, while, if the option mix decreases from the
median level to the 25 percentile level, turnover probability increases from 0.16 to 0.19.
Thus, there is a considerable negative relationship between CEO turnover probability
and option mix. Such strong and negative relationship confirms our supposition that
stock options are used as a deferred compensation to provide incentive for CEOs to
thrive longer.
To see the magnitude of the change in turnover probability more clearly, we estimate
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the expected remaining years CEO would serve the firm if the turnover probability were
constant over time. Table 13 summarizes the results. The expected remaining years for
the median CEOs are 6.2 years. If total compensation increases from the median level
to the 75 percentile level, the expected remaining years would increase to 7.1 years, an
increase by 15 percent. On the other hand, if the option mix increase from the median
level to the 75 percentile level, expected remaining years increases from 6.2 years to 7.4
years. This is an increase of a similar magnitude. Both total compensation and option
mix appear to be significant determinants of the turnover probability.
Prior empirical work regarding the incentive effect of stock options customarily
investigated how total compensation is tied to firm performance (for example, Hall and
Liebman, 2000). In doing so, they simply included options in the total compensation,
treating them as cash. However, this approach ignores the particular characteristics
of options as deferred compensation. Our estimated negative relationship between the
form of compensation and CEO turnover probability provides fresh evidence that stock
options are used as deferred compensation to bind CEOs to the firm, and that this
feature of stock options provides longer term incentives to CEOs.
7.3 Managerial entrenchment through interlocking director-
ship
We found little evidence of the managerial entrenchment through interlocking director-
ship. First, we did not find evidence of such managerial entrenchment for our main
results. The estimated coefficient for interlocking directorship dummy for our hetero-
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geneity model is 0.371, and this is statistically insignificant (see Table 8).
Such a result may indicate that the importance of the board being filled with the
CEO’s supporters may be minimal. For example, an interlocking directorship can occur
simply because two firms are involved in a business relationship (Hallock, 1997). In
such cases, the board of director with interlocking directorship would have little interest
in keeping CEOs with bad performance. This case may be especially relevant for our
sample since our sample contains CEOs whose tenure is ten years or less. It would be
difficult for inexperienced CEOs to have discretion in choosing new board members. Note
that we incorporate left-censored observations, the estimated coefficient for interlocking
directorship becomes -0.291, with t-statistics equal to 2.32. This negative relationship
may be spurious, resulting from biases due to left censoring.
7.4 Incentives generated by the threat of dismissal
Table 12 also reports the sensitivity of CEO turnover probability to the change in firm
performance measured by the returns to shareholders. A change in firm performance
appears to have a smaller impact on turnover probability compared to total compensa-
tion and option mix: when the returns to shareholders decrease from the median level
to the 25 percentile level, the turnover probability increases from 0.161 to 0.172, and
when the returns to shareholders improves from the median level to the 75 percentile
level, the turnover probability would decrease only to 0.150. Such results translate to
a decrease in the expected remaining years from 6.21 to 5.81 years when firm perfor-
mance deteriorates from the median level to the 25 percentile level, and an increase in
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the expected remaining years from 6.21 to 6.67 when firm performance improves from
the median level to the 75 percentile level. For either case, the changes in the expected
remaining years are small, ranging between 6% to 7%.
Such a weak relationship between CEO performance and turnover probability may
suggest that CEOs are not disciplined by a threat of dismissal, also confirmed by
Jensen and Murphy (1990, A). Jensen and Murphy computed turnover related pay-
for-performance sensitivity and showed that CEOs would lose only 8.3 cents for each
$1000 lost by shareholders. However, there is a notable difference between Jensen and
Murphy’s results and our results; that is, our estimate for turnover probability is much
higher than Jensen and Murphy’s. Their estimate for turnover probability for a 53 year
old CEO is 0.046 while our comparable estimate is 0.16. 6 Our estimate is larger than
Jensen and Murphy’s by more than a factor of 3.
Jensen and Murphy’s small estimates may be partly because they did not exclude the
left censored observations which would have biased their estimate downwards. It could
also be that their estimate was contaminated with a similar problem with age variables,
which is already discussed in section 6.1. Due to the problem with the age variable
in ExecuComp, inclusion of an age variable produces unrealistically low turnover rate.
We suspect that Jensen and Murphy might have underestimated the turnover related
pay-for-performance sensitivity. Therefore, we reexamine the turnover related pay-for-
performance sensitivity based on our estimated turnover probability.
6Since the median age for CEOs with 4 years of experience is 50 years old, we believe that the our
estimated turnover probability is comparable to Jensen and Murphy’s figure.
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First we compute the upper bound of wealth losses when our median CEO is dis-
missed at the fourth year of tenure. We assume that the CEO’s wage profile would
follow the median values presented in the Table 4 and that the CEO would have no al-
ternative employment opportunities for five years.7 This means that the CEO’s wealth
losses when he or she is dismissed at the fourth year of tenure is the present discount
value (PDV) of the lost total compensation from the fifth year of tenure to the tenth
year of tenure plus present discounted value of forfeited stock options. We assume that
all the unvested options are forfeited and that all the stock options vest in three years.
Therefore, the wealth losses are written as
Wealth Losses
= PDV of cumulative income from 5th tenure until 10th tenure
+ PDV of stock options granted from 2rd tenure to 4th tenure (12)
Using the discount value of 3%, the upper bound of wealth losses if the median CEO
is dismissed are $20.65 million, with PDV of cumulative income equal to $17.64 million
and PDV of forfeited stock options equal to $3.01 million.
Table 15 summarizes the expected wealth losses due to the threat of dismissal at
different levels of firm performance. Expected value of wealth losses at the fourth year of
tenure with a given turnover probability are computed as (Wealth losses if the CEO )×
(turnover probability). When the returns to shareholders are at the median level, the
7Our assumptions differ from Jensen and Murphy’s. They assumed that the CEO would have no
alternative job from age 53 until 65, and that they would receive $1 million until age of 65 if they were
not dismissed.
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expected wealth losses are $3.32 million. When the firm performance is at the 25 per-
centile level, the expected wealth losses are $3.55 million. Therefore, a deterioration in
firm performance from the median level to 25 percentile level would cause an increase
in the expected CEO wealth losses by $0.23 million.
Now, we compute the pay for performance sensitivity due to the threat of dismissal.
Since we could not tell if a CEO is fired or quit, the terminology, dismissal, is used as
a shorthand of turnover. The median of the firm value for our sample (when CEOs
are at the third year of tenure) is about $1.74 billion. Therefore, when the returns to
shareholders deteriorate from the median level to the 75 percentile level, shareholders
would lose about $426.56 million.8 This means that CEO would lose 56.9 cents for each
$1000 lost by shareholders. This estimate is considerably higher than the comparable
figure estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990, A): Jensen and Murphy’s estimate is
that the CEO would loose only 8.6 cents for each $1000 lost by share: Our estimate
of turnover related pay-for-performance sensitivity is greater than Jensen and Murphy’s
estimate by factor of 7.
Again, this difference may be from the fact that Jensen and Murphy did not exclude
the left censored observations, or it may be because of a similar problem with the age
variable which we found in ExecuComp data set. While we do not attempt to test
8Because of the definition of returns to shareholders, we can compute the change in share-
holders’ wealth, which is defined as (frim value)t − (frim value)t−1 + (dividend payout)t, as
(Return to shareholders) ∗ (Firmvalue)t−1. The median level of the returns to shareholders is 0.028,
making the change in shareholders’ wealth $102 million. 25 percentile level of the return is -0.189,
making the change in shareholders’ wealth -$427.56 million. Therefore, a worsening of the return from
the median level to the 25 percentile level would have lost shareholders’ wealth by $426.56 million.
35
whether our estimated pay-for-performance sensitivity is consistent with the principal
agent theory, it may be the case that previous literature grossly underestimated the
turnover related pay for performance sensitivity.
8 Sensitivity of estimates to the inclusion of left cen-
sored observations
In order to avoid biases arising from left censoring , our main estimation uses the sample
that contains only the CEOs who became CEOs after our sample period began. Much
of the prior research regarding CEO turnover, however, does not address such an issue.
In this section, we present the sensitivity in the estimated coefficients when we included
the left censored observations.
Inclusion of left censored observations are problematic. For example, suppose we
have two types of CEOs, one with a high propensity for turnover and the other with
a low propensity of turnover. Further, suppose that they started their tenure prior to
our sample period, say 1988. Then, CEOs who have a high propensity of turnover may
not survive until the beginning our sample period, 1993, and only the CEOs with a low
propensity of turnover survive until our sample period. This means that if we include
left censored observations, we artificially increase the number of individuals who have a
lower propensity of turnover, causing bias in our turnover probability estimates. In this
section, we illustrate the sensitivity in the estimates when we include the left censored
observations.
Table 12 shows the estimated coefficient for Model 3 for the sample that excludes
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left censored observations, and for the sample that includes left censored observation.
The coefficient for total compensation for the sample without left censored observation
is -0.246 while it is -0.111 for the sample with left censored observations. Inclusion of
left censored observations lowers the estimate in magnitude by more than 50%. The
coefficient for option mix is -1.03 for the sample without left censored observations while
it is -0.8 for the sample with left censored observations. The coefficients for returns
to shareholders decreases almost by 50% in magnitude. Therefore, inclusion of left
censoring severely underestimate the sensitivity of the logit of leaving to the change in
total compensation, option mix and returns to shareholders.
The coefficient for interlocking directorship changes the sign when we include the left
censored observations. The coefficient for interlocking directorship is 0.37 for the sample
without left censored observation, while it is -0.29 for the sample with left censored
observations. However, we are not able to conclude whether this negative relationship
is due to the true effect of an interlocking directorship.
In sum, we found that inclusion of left censored observation underestimates the effect
of total compensation, option mix and returns to shareholders. In addition, the sign of
coefficients for interlocking directorship becomes negative, though this negative effect of
interlocking directorship may be spurious. The prior studies regarding CEO turnover
mostly investigated the relationship between the firm performance and CEO turnover
(i.e., Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988). However, since such studies have ignored the
issues about left censoring, they might have grossly underestimated the effect of firm
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performance on CEO turnover.
9 Conclusion
This paper contributed to the CEO compensation literature by providing a link between
the form of CEO compensation and CEO turnover probability, and the link between
the amount of the compensation and turnover probability. The form of compensation
was represented by the proportion of stock options as part of CEO compensation. We
estimated these relationships by using a joint equations model that incorporates a time
invariant unobserved explanatory variable. We found that both the amount and the
form of total compensation have significant impact on CEO turnover probability.
We found that an increase in the proportion of options in total compensation from
the median level to the 75 percentile level would decrease the turnover probability from
16% to 13.5%, while an increase in the amount of total compensation from the median
level to the 75 percentile level would decrease turnover probability from 16% to 14%.
This would mean that, if the probability of separation were constant over time, an
increase in the proportion of option mix from the median level to the 75 percentile level
would increase the expected remaining lifetime of CEO from 6.2 years to 7.4 years (a
19% increase), and the increase in total compensation from the median level to the 75
percentile level would also lead to a change of a similar magnitude. The significantly
negative effect of option mix is consistent with the view that stock options are used as
a deferred compensation that provides longer incentive to CEOs.
Our study finds little support for the managerial entrenchment hypothesis through
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interlocking directorship and consistent evidence for matching hypothesis: The presence
of interlocking directorship did not appear to have negative effect on turnover probability
for CEOs whose tenure is less than 10 after controlling for the potentially severe biases
due to left censoring.
Although changes in firm performance has a relatively small effect on the turnover
probability, the turnover related pay-for-performance sensitivity is greater than the com-
parable figure estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990, A). Our estimated turnover prob-
ability implies that the median CEOs with 4 years of experience would lose 56.9 cents
for each $1000 lost by shareholders. This is greater than a comparable figure estimated
by Jensen and Murphy’s by factor of 7: They estimated that CEOs would lose only
8.6 cents for each $1000 lost by shareholders. Finally, we found that estimated coeffi-
cients are very sensitive to the inclusion of left censored observations. Inclusion of left
censored observations severely underestimates the effect of total compensation, option
mix and the returns to shareholders. This data issue may have lead other researchers to
underestimate the turnover related pay-for-performance sensitivity.
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Table 1: Yearly average of total compensation
Year # of obs Average total comp
1993 1330 1.93
1994 1495 2.26
1995 1572 2.21
1996 1639 2.89
1997 1699 3.59
1998 1627 4.09
1999 1653 5.36
2000 1656 6.66
2001 1590 5.91
2002 1575 4.21
2003 1494 3.46
Compensation figures are in million dollars
Table 2: Yearly average of salary, bonuses and options
Year # of obs Salary Bonus Option
1993 1330 0.63 0.50 0.79
1994 1495 0.63 0.55 1.09
1995 1572 0.63 0.56 1.03
1996 1639 0.63 0.67 1.59
1997 1699 0.62 0.66 2.31
1998 1627 0.62 0.65 2.81
1999 1653 0.63 0.75 3.98
2000 1656 0.64 0.78 5.24
2001 1590 0.65 0.67 4.60
2002 1575 0.66 0.70 2.84
2003 1494 0.67 0.83 1.95
Compensation figures are in million dollars
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Table 3: Yearly average of Option mix
Year # of obs Average option mix
1994 1495 0.29
1995 1572 0.28
1996 1639 0.33
1997 1699 0.37
1998 1627 0.44
1999 1653 0.47
2000 1656 0.47
2001 1590 0.51
2002 1575 0.48
2003 1494 0.42
Table 4: Median compensation by tenure
CEO tenure # of obs Salary Bonus Options Total Option Mix
1 1519 0.504 0.302 0.930 1.991 0.515
2 1210 0.602 0.390 0.842 2.000 0.453
3 928 0.641 0.457 0.930 2.186 0.446
4 640 0.688 0.452 1.092 2.525 0.476
5 432 0.713 0.494 1.137 2.598 0.495
6 269 0.753 0.543 1.351 2.950 0.486
7 168 0.797 0.689 1.365 3.141 0.470
8 104 0.849 0.519 1.916 3.593 0.574
9 52 0.911 0.736 1.552 3.518 0.494
10 20 0.855 0.829 1.565 3.860 0.429
Compensation figures are in million dollars
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Table 5: Choice of independent variables and exclusion restrictions
Variables that directly affect turnover Excluded variables
(Z variables)
(Returns to shareholders)t (Inter locking directorship dummy)t−1
log(Market to book asset ratio)t−1 (% change in sales)t−1
∆log(market to book asset ratio)t log(dividend yeild+ 1)t
(% change in sales)t log(dividend yeild+ 1)t−1
(Interlocking directirship dummy)t (
R&D
assets
)t−1
tenure Dummy{R&D = 0}t−1
(tenure)2 (industry average option share)t
log(sales)t (industry average option share)t−1
( R&D
assets
)t (industry average total comp)t
Dummy{R&D = 0}t (industry average total comp)t−1
log(stock price volatility)
Year dummies
industry dummies
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Table 6: Choice of variables for initial turnover equation
Variables
log(Market to book asset ratio)t
∆log(market to book asset ratio)t
(% change in sales)t
(Interlocking directirship dummy)t
log(sales)t
( R&D
assets
)t
Dummy{R&D = 0}t
log(stock price volatility)
log(dividend yeild+ 1)t
Year dummies
industry dummies
(industry average total comp)t
(industry average option share)t
Outside succession dummy
S&P 500 dummy
S&P midcap dummy
earnings per share dummy
number of board meeting during the year
Table 7: Data summary statistics (1993 - 2003)
Variable # of obs Mean St div Min Max
Thereturnstoshareholders 3831 0.34 9.45 -1.0 582.9
Market to book asset ratio 5350 2.07 2.09 0.36 78.6
%saleschange 5350 10.8 42.08 -96.7 1533.1
Interlocking directorship dummy 5350 0.04 0.20 0 1
Tenure 5350 2.96 1.96 1 11
R&D
Assets
5350 0.03 0.07 0 1.18
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Table 8: Estimation results by models
Model 1 Model 3
log(Total compensation) -0.176 -0.246
(0.084) (0.140)
Option share -0.937 -1.032
(0.299) (0.323)
Return to Shareholders -0.298 -0.300
(0.176) (0.122)
Interlocking directorship dummy 0.349 0.371
(0.317) (0.273)
ρ1 (turnover equation) – 0.148
(0.153)
ρ2 (Total comp equation) – 0.749
(0.024)
ρ3 (Option mix equation) – 0.172
(0.006)
ρ4 (Selection equation) – -1.214
(0.461)
a. Inside the brackets are robust standard errors.
b. BGM results show that total compensation and option mix are exogenous, we do not
use first stage equations in Model 2. Therefore Mode 1 and Model 2 are identical
Table 9: Irrelevance test for excluded variables
Equations Test stat AdjustedR2 Decision
log(total compensation) 4.56 0.449 Reject irrelevance
(1.83)
Option share 5.12 0.219 Reject irrelevance
(1.83)
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Table 10: Tests for over-identification and exogeneity
Joint test for Total compensation and Option Mix
Equations Test stat Results
(5% Crit val)
Over-identification 3.75 Fail to reject
(15.51)
Exogenous test 2.48 Fail to Reject
(5.99)
Table 11: The median, the 25 percentile and the 75 percentile values for CEOs at their
4th year of tenure
Variables 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Total compensation (in million) 1.31 2.52 5.00
Option share .279 .476 .672
Returns to shareholders -.189 .059 .340
Log(Market to book asset ratio) 0.203 .484 .484
∆log(Market to book asset ratio) -.158 -.006 .121
%changeinsales -1.45 6.46 15.73
Interlocking directorship dummy – 0 1
tenure 4
tenuresq 16
Sales (in million) 0.63 1.78 5.13
R & D ratio 0 .0031 .0341
R & D zero dummy 1 0 0
log(Volatility) -1.28 -1.00 -.670
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Table 12: Sensitivity of CEO turnover probability due to changes in selected variables
Model 3: Heterogeneity Model
Variables 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Total compensation 0.184 0.161 0.140
Option mix 0.191 0.161 0.135
returns to Shareholders 0.172 0.161 0.150
Table 13: Remaining expected lifetime from 5th year of tenure
Model 3 (Preferred Model)
Variables 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Total Compensation 5.43 years 6.21 years 7.14 years
Option share 5.24 years 6.21 years 7.41 years
∆(shareholders′wealth) 5.81 years 6.21 years 6.67 years
Table 14: Irrelevance test for excluded variables
CEOs with 25 CEOs with 25
percentile performance percentile performance
Turnover Expected Turnover Expected Difference Pay-
probability wealth losses probability Wealth losses in expected performance
wealth sensitivity
losses from
the median
to the 25th
percentile
performance
0.172 $3.55 0.161 $3.32 $0.23 53.9 cents
million million million per $1000
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Table 15: Sensitivity of estimates to the inclusion of left censored observations
A sample without A sample with
left censored obs left censored obs
Variables Model 3 Model 3
Total compensation -0.246 -0.111
(0.140) (0.068)
Option mix -1.032 -0.803
(0.323) (0.170)
Returns to shareholders -0.300 -0.170
(0.122) (0.058)
Interlocking directorship 0.371 -0.291
(0.237) (0.126)
ρ1 (turnover equation) 0.148 -0.009
(0.153) (0.066)
ρ2 (Total comp equation) 0.749 0.64
(0.024) (0.006)
ρ3 (Option mix equation) 0.172 0.161
(0.006) (0.003)
ρ4 (Selection equation) -1.214 –
(0.461) –
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Chapter II
An alternative theory of the relationship between tenure and
incentive in a principal-agent setting.
1 Introduction
One of the standard results of principal agent theories is that pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity increases with tenure as CEO, but this has not been supported by prior empirical
studies. Murphy (1986) uses CEO compensation data between 1974 and 1984 and finds
that pay-for-performance sensitivity is smaller for CEOs whose tenure is greater than 4.6
years than for CEOs with shorter tenure. This result means that pay-for-performance
sensitivity decreases with CEO tenure, a result which contradicts the standard principal-
agent theories. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) also use CEO compensation data between
1971 and 1989 and similarly find that pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases as CEO
tenure increases, contradicting standard principal-agent theories.
Such results leave us unsure if CEO compensation is consistent with standard-
principal agent theories and raise a question about whether standard principal-agent
theories like Gibbons and Murphy’s (1992) accurately describe CEO compensation.
Since prior literature consistently finds a negative relationship between incentive and
tenure, we find it worthwhile to develop a model that hypothesizes a negative relation-
ship between incentive and tenure.
Our model is an extension of Prendergast’s model (2002), which shows that there is
a positive relationship between incentive and uncertainty. In his model, uncertainty
dictates if the principal chooses “input-based compensation” or “output-based compen-
sation”. For input-based compensation, the agent is rewarded by his or her input, i.e.,
if he or she is keeping busy. On the other hand, output-based compensation ties com-
pensation to output, i.e., the firm’s value. Therefore, output based compensation is an
incentive intensive compensation. Prendergast shows that under greater uncertainty,
the principal is more likely to choose output-based compensation, demonstrating the
positive relationship between incentive and uncertainty.
Our study’s reasoning is simple. Uncertainty regarding the outcome of the busi-
ness stems not only from the business environment but also from uncertainty regarding
the CEO’s ability. The CEO’s ability becomes gradually known to the principal over
time, thus decreasing the principal’s uncertainty of the business outcome. Then, assum-
ing Prendergast result, we see that the principal is more likely to choose input-based
compensation for CEO’s with longer tenure because of the reduced uncertainty. This
suggests a negative relationship between incentive and tenure.
2 Prior literature
Murphy (1986) characterizes the incentive contract for CEOs in a multi-period principal-
agent setting. In his model, the agent works for a fixed number of periods. His model
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implies that pay increases are spread evenly throughout the remaining years, i.e., good
performance is rewarded as a shift in the earning-tenure profile. This in turn implies
that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with tenure because for later years, the
reward is spread among fewer years. Thus the same increase in output causes greater
increase in annual compensation.9 The econometric model is ∆ln(Salary +Bonus)it =
α+β(Y ears as CEO)+δ(Rate of return on common equity)it+it. Murphy uses CEO
compensation data between 1974 and 1984. He divides the data into three sub-samples;
the first sub-sample is for CEOs with tenure of 4.6 and less, the second sub-sample is for
CEOs with tenure between 4.6 and 9.9 and the third sub-sample is for CEOs with tenures
greater than 9.9. Murphy finds that δ is smaller for those with longer tenure. Thus the
estimated results show that pay-for-performance actually decreases with tenure, which
is inconsistent with the standard results of principal-agent theories. 10
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) develop a model that characterizes the incentive con-
tract when the agent has reputational career concern. In their model, good current per-
formance positively affects the CEO’s assessed ability, as assessed by the shareholders.
The assessed ability is interpreted as the “reputation” of the CEO. A good reputation
causes an increase in his or her future compensation, thus creating incentives for CEOs
to exert effort even without an explicit incentive contract. However, the reputational
concerns disappear as the CEO reaches his or her retirement. To supplement such a loss
9Therefore, the implication that pay-for-performance increases with tenure depends on the finiteness
of a CEO’s lifetime.
10They conclude that those results are supported by learning model instead.
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in incentive, firms may intensify pay-for-performance sensitivity as the CEO approaches
his or her retirement. Gibbons and Murphy’s model has two implications: (i) Hold-
ing CEO tenure constant, pay-for-performance sensitivity increases as CEOs reach their
retirement. (ii) Holding years to retirement constant, pay-for-performance sensitivity
increases as CEO tenure increases. The second implication is relevant for our study.
The reason for the second implication is as follows. First, because of the agent’s risk
aversion, the standard trade-off between incentive and uncertainty holds, i.e., pay-for-
performance sensitivity decreases with the uncertainty of business performance. Suppose
that the firm’s output is given by yt = η + at + t where η is the unobservable ability of
a CEO (unobservable both by CEOs and the shareholders), at is the effort and t is the
usual independent random shocks. Notice that there are two sources of uncertainty to
both shareholders and the CEO, η and t. Although η is not directly observable (both by
the shareholders and by the CEO), it can be inferred by repeatedly observing the firm’s
output over time. Because the uncertainty about the ability of the CEO decreases over
time, so does the overall uncertainty of the business outcome. By the inverse relationship
between incentive and uncertainty, Gibbons and Murphy show that pay-for-performance
sensitivity should decrease with tenure.
Their econometric model to test the pay-for-performance incentive relationship is
the following. ∆(Salary+Bonuses)it = β1(low tenure dummy)×∆ln(Firm V alue)it+
∑1988
n=1972 βn(n
th year dummyit) × ∆ln(Firm value)it + β′(other variables)it. The the-
ory predicts that β1 is negative, reflecting the negative relationship between pay-for-
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performance sensitivity and CEO tenure. They used CEO compensation data between
1971 and 1989 to estimate this model. They find a positive but statistically insignificant
coefficient. The implication of their theory that incentive and uncertainty have a positive
relationship is thus not strongly supported by the data. Nonetheless, they finds evidence
that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases as the agent reaches his or her retirement,
although the magnitude of the increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity is surprisingly
small. For the CEOs with cash earning of $562,000, 10% change in shareholders wealth
corresponds to $7,300 of CEO ’s wealth change for CEOs more than three years from
retirement, but $9,500 for CEOs fewer than thee years to retirement.
Note again that the basic reason why pay-for-performance increases with tenure
in Gibbons and Murphy (1999) is because of the standard inverse relationship between
incentive and risk. Contrary to such standard results, Prendergast (2002) shows that un-
der some conditions pay-for-performance sensitivity is non-decreasing with uncertainty.
In his model, uncertainty dictates if the principal chooses “input-based compensation”
or “output-based compensation”. For input-based compensation, the agent is rewarded
by his or her input, i.e., if he or she is keeping busy. On the other hand, output-based
compensation ties the compensation to the output, i.e., the firm’s value. It is assumed
that making output-based compensation incurs a fixed cost to the firm so firms want
to avoid output-based compensation if necessary. Assuming that the agent observes
the business environment better than the principal, if the uncertainty of the business
environment is significant, the principal delegates the decision making power to the
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agent. However, to keep the agent from abusing the delegated power, the principal uses
output-based compensation. In other words, under greater uncertainty, the benefit of
delegating decision making power to the agent exceeds the cost of making output-based
compensation. If the business environment is less uncertain, the principal keeps the
decision making power to himself or herself and uses input-based compensation. Since
output-based compensation ties compensation to output, we are likely to observe greater
pay-for-performance sensitivity when uncertainty is large.
Tadelis (2002) shows that incentive from a reputational concern is ageless: The
optimal incentive contract is the same for both younger and older workers. In Tadelis’
model, reputation is a tradeable good. Suppose that the agent works for two periods,
then retire. At the beginning of the period, the agent buys a “name” by working for a
company. Upon retirement, he or she sells the name. In the first period, the reputation
affects the second period income which creates an incentive. In the second period,
the reputation determines the price at which the agent can sell the name, creating
continued concerned for reputation. The author shows that the incentive in the first
period and the second period are quantitatively equivalent. Tadelis is mainly concerned
with the relationship between incentive and the years to retirement, thus his task is
not to show the relationship between incentive and tenure. However, if all agents are
assumed to begin their tenure as CEOs at the same ages, his model suggests that pay-
for-performance sensitivity is constant with regard to tenure.
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3 Basic intuition of our model
The basic result of standard principal-agent theories like Gibbons and Murphy (1992),
that a positive relationship exists between incentive and tenure, is derived from the
standard inverse relationship between incentive and uncertainty. Since the principal’s
uncertainty about the agent’s ability decreases over time, the inverse relationship be-
tween incentive and uncertainty leads to the conclusion that the incentive intensity of
compensation is higher for an agent with longer tenure.
Our alternative theory shows otherwise that the incentive intensity of the compensa-
tion package increases with tenure. We borrow the framework from Prendergast (2002)
which shows that incentive intensity of compensation decreases with uncertainty. Sup-
pose that the principal hires an agent to perform one of n tasks. The principal makes
one of the following two types of contracts; Input based-contracts or output-based con-
tracts. For input based contracts, the principal chooses a task that the agent should
perform and pay according to the agent’s input (how busy the agent keep himself of
herself). For output-based contracts, the principal delegates the task-choosing decision
to the agent, but to keep the agent from abusing the delegated power, the principal ties
compensation to the output: Delegation of decision making power always comes with
an output-based contract. Since output-based contracts tie compensation to output, it
is an incentive-intensive compensation.
Prendergast makes two assumptions: (i) The agent knows better than the principal
about how the business should be conducted. (ii) Making an output-based contract is
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more costly than making an input-based contract for the principal. Under such con-
ditions, the principal faces the following trade-offs: First, the principal will want to
delegate the decision to the agent (since the agent knows the business environment bet-
ter), but making output-based contract is expensive. Second, it is cheaper to make
input-based contracts but the principal faces the risk of choosing the wrong task. Note
that the more uncertain the environment, the more likely it is that the principal makes
the wrong decision. Thus, under large uncertainty, the benefit of delegating the decision
to the agent is more likely to exceed the cost of output-based contracts. This means that
the principal is likely to choose output-based compensation when uncertainty is large.
On the other hand, if the uncertainty about the business outcome is small, the principal
is likely to choose the correct task. Thus, cost of output-based compensation is likely to
outweigh the benefit of delegating the decision making power to the agent. This means
that when uncertainty is small, the principal is more likely to choose input based com-
pensation. Since output-based compensation is the incentive intensive compensation, a
positive relationship exist between incentive and uncertainty.
We extend Prendergast’ model (2002) to a multi-period setting to show that incen-
tive decreases with tenure. Uncertainty regarding the outcome of the business stems not
only from the business environment but also from uncertainty regarding the CEO’s abil-
ity. The CEO’s ability is gradually revealed over time, decreasing the overall uncertainty
of the business outcome. Using Prendergast’s result, we show that the principal is more
likely to use output-based compensation earlier in the agent’s tenure. This suggests a
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negative relationship between tenure and incentive.
We should carefully interpret our results. Our model indicates that firms are more
likely to use input-based compensation for agents with longer tenure, which implies that
the agent with longer tenure has less discretion over the choice of tasks. One possible
criticism is that it is more intuitive to assume that an agent with longer tenure has more
discretion over what tasks he or she performs. In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume
that an agent becomes entrenched over time so as to avoid the disciplinary mechanisms
of principal-agent relationship. In such cases, the agent gains more discretion over what
he or she performs as tenure increases. However, such entrenchment considerations
are beyond the focus of our model. As long as the employment contract works like
the principal-agent model, and as long as the agent does not become entrenched as
tenure increases, it is not necessary that the principal gives more discretion to the agent
simply because the agent has a long tenure. We can also understand the input-based
compensation contract as the principal and agent mutually agreeing to undertake a
certain task.
4 Settings
The principal employs an agent to perform one of n possible tasks. At the beginning
of the period, the principal and the agent jointly draw match parameters θi, i = 1, . . . n
for each task. i denotes the task. θi is interpreted as a task specific ability of the
agent. For simplicity, we assume that these match parameters are distributed normally
and independently but possibly with different means and variances. The distribution of
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those parameters are assumed to be common knowledge for both the principal and the
agent.
When the agent undertakes task i at period t, the output depends on the match
parameter θi, random variable ρti and the effort eti. The output at period t is assumed
to have the following form.
yit = θi + ρit + eit
The randomness of ρit capture the riskiness of task i at period t. For simplicity, we
assume that θi, ρjt and eit are independent for all i, j, and t. The distribution of ρit
are common knowledge for both the principal and the agent. The distribution is task
specific and time-invariant. For simplicity, we assume that they are drawn from normal
distributions possibly with different means and variances. The cost of effort is given by
C(eti), which is assumed to be a strictly convex and monotonically increasing function.
The basic premise of the model is that the agent has more information about the
realized values of the match θi and task specific uncertainty ρti than the principal. We
assume that the agent can directly observe the realized values of ρti and θi but the
principal can only observe the realized value of output yit. The principal can only infer
the realized value of θi by repeatedly observing output over time. For each period, a
wage contract is made before the agent sees the realized value of ρti. The principal’s
problem is not only to induce the correct effort but also to induce the correct action, or to
assign the correct task to the agent. The agent is assumed to have personal preferences
for tasks he or she enjoys most. Bi denotes the private benefit of doing the i
th task.
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Both the principal and the agent are assumed to be risk neutral. Let u(w) = w be
the utility function of the agent where w is the total compensation. This is the same
assumption as Prendergast (2002). The reason why we assume the agent’s risk neutrality
is to isolate the effect of uncertainty on the principal’s decision to choose an incentive
contract from the standard trade-off between incentive and uncertainty arising from the
agent’s risk aversion.11
The principal chooses either an input-based contract or an output-based contract.
For an input-based contract, the principal chooses a task that the agent should perform,
and rewards the agent depending on the effort that he or she exerts. (i.e., whether the
agent is keeping busy ). For an output-based contract, the principal lets the agent choose
the task and reward the agent based on the output. Since an output-based contract
ties compensation to output, it is incentive-intensive compensation. When making an
output-based contract, the principal incurs a fixed cost my, and when making an input-
based contract, the principal incurs a fixed cost me. It is assumed that my > me.
The fixed cost my is the manifestation of the cost associated with making an incentive-
contract in a multi-task setting. 12
For the most part, we assume that once the agent is hired he or she will be hired
11Standard trade-off between incentive-pay and uncertainty is the following. Assume that agent
is risk-avese. Under greater uncertainty, incentive intensive compensaiton should be accompanied by
higher expected compensation in order to satisty the participation constraint of the agent. Therefore,
to principal, high-powered incentive plan comes at cost of higher expected pay. Thus, if uncertainty
is too high, the principal reduces the incentive-intensity of the compensation package.For example, see
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
12Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)argues that, since complex jobs have many dimensions of perfor-
mance, some of which are poorly observed, rewarding on the observed dimensions can have harmful
effects on the unobserved dimensions, making it more costly to make output-based contract.
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forever. We relax this assumption by later introducing turnover into the model. Intro-
duction of turnover does not alter our main result that incentive decreases with tenure.
The following part of the paper is organized as follows. In section 5, we present
the simplest model where matching parameters are excluded from the model. This
section is intended to clear up why we have a positive relationship between incentive
and uncertainty. Section 6 introduces matching parameters into the model. This section
shows that incentive is non-increasing with tenure. Section 7 incorporates turnover into
the model.
5 The simplest case: Without match parameters
In this section, we present the simplest case in which the model does not include match
parameters. This is to clear up the reason why the principal chooses output-based
compensation when he or she faces large uncertainty. Output is given by
yti = ρti + eti
Without match parameters, this model becomes one of the models described in Pren-
dergast (2002). Prendergast (2002) shows that there can be a positive relationship
between uncertainty and incentive pay. Let n=2, and assume that ρti, i = 1, 2 are drawn
independently from N(0, τ 2) for all t.
5.1 Optimal input-based contract at the initial period (t=0)
The reservation utility for the agent is normalized to zero. Assume that the private
benefits for the agent are B1 = 0, and B2 = B > 0. The principal does not know
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for which task the agent has private benefit. Since both tasks look ex-ante identical to
the principal, the principal randomly chooses the task and assign it to the agent. The
principal’s problem is given by
max
e0i, w(e0i), i=1, 2
E[ρ0i + e0i − w(e0i)]−me (13)
s.t
E[w(e0i)− C(e0i)] ≥ 0 (14)
Notice, that for input based compensation, the effort level is observable. It can be easily
shown that the constraint binds at the optimum, so that E[w(e0i)] = C(e0i). Plug
this into (13), and we can see that the principal chooses the optimal level of effort by
maximizing E[ρ0i+ e0i−C(e0i)]−me. By noting that the expectation of ρ0i is zero, and
by taking the derivative of C(e0i) with respect to the effort, we obtain the optimal choice
of effort e∗, which is the solution to C ′(e∗) = 1. The expected surplus for the principal is
e∗−C(e∗)−me. The expected surplus for the agent is B/2 since the principal randomly
chooses between the two tasks. The total surplus (sum of principal’s surplus and agent’s
surplus) is, thus, equal to
e∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2 (15)
5.2 Optimal output-based contract at the initial period (t=0)
Since the agent is risk neutral by assumption, the principal “sells” the firm at a fixed
price α0. In other words, the principal offers a wage contract w0i = y0i − α0.
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The utility maximization problem for the agent is given by
max
ei, i=1,2
E[ρi + ei − α0 − C(ei)] (16)
Since α0 is constant, the agent chooses the optimal effort by solving C
′(e) = 1. This
shows that the optimal effort level is the same as that for input-based compensation, e∗.
After the contract is made, the agent observes the realized value of ρi. The agent then
chooses the task so as to maximizes his or her utility ρ0i + e
∗ +Bi. We assume that Bi
is so small that the agent ignores the private benefit upon choosing the task, that is, the
agent chooses the task that maximizes θi + ρ0i. This is the same assumption made by
Prendergast (2002). This simple example shows that output-based compensation induces
the correct level of effort e∗ and the correct task, the task that maximizes output.
The principal chooses the optimal value of α0 in the following way. The princi-
pal knows that the agent chooses the task that produces higher output. Let ρ̂0 =
max{ρ01, ρ02}. Notice that ρ̂0 is a second order statistic of two independent random
samples from N(0, τ 2). Since both the agent and principal do not observe the realized
values of ρ0i for i=1, 2 at the time of the contract, the output is a random variable for
both the principal and agent, given by ρ̂0 + e0i. The principal’s problem is, then, given
by
max
e0i, α0 i=1,2
E[ρ̂0 + ei − w(e0i)]−my (17)
s.t
E[w(e0i)− C(e0i)] ≥ 0 (18)
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Since neither the agent nor the principal observe the realized value of ρi at the time of
contract, there is no information asymmetry. Thus the optimal choice of α0 is the value
that binds the participation constraint which is given by
E[ρ̂0 + e
∗ − α0]− C(e∗) = 0 (19)
By noting that E[ρ̂0] =
√
τ2
pi
, we have
α0 =
√
τ 2
pi
+ e∗ − C(e∗) (20)
By adding the agent’s surplus, B/2, to (20), we obtain the sum of surpluses for both the
principal and the agent,13 which is given by√
τ 2
pi
+ e∗ − C(e∗)−my + B
2
(21)
5.3 The condition where output-based contract is chosen at
period 0
If the surplus from output-based compensation (21) exceeds the surplus from input-based
compensation (15), the principal chooses output-based compensation. This condition is
givey by √
τ 2
pi
+ e∗ − C(e∗)−my +B/2 ≥ e∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2
=⇒√
τ 2
pi
≥ my −me (22)
Notice that the larger τ is, the more likely it is for the principal to choose output-
based compensation. This illustrate the positive relationship between uncertainty and
13We divide B by 2 since the chance that the task with higher realized value of ρ0i also has the private benefit is 1/2.
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incentive. The more uncertain the business environment is, the greater the likelihood
that output-based contract is chosen. The idea is that, if the business environment is
uncertain to the principal, the principal has little to say about how the business should
be conducted. Therefore, the principal delegates the business decision to the agent who
observes the business environment more clearly. To keep the agent from abusing the
delegated power (for example, the agent may choose a task based on personal preference
which may not maximize output), the principal ties compensation to output. It can be
seen that this simple example illustrates the positive relationship between uncertainty
and incentive-based pay.
5.4 Condition where output-based compensation is chosen at
period t
Because of the iid assumption about ρit, the decision rule at period t, t ≥ 1 is the same
as the decision rule at period 0, i.e., at period t, the principal chooses output-based
compensation if the following holds.
√
τ 2
pi
≥ my −me (23)
The principal is more likely to choose output-based compensation when the business
environment is more uncertain.
6 A model with match parameters
The realized values of the match parameters are not directly observable to the princi-
pal. Thus, those parameters introduce additional uncertainty into the model. Match
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parameters can be interpreted as the agent’s productivity of performing a specific task
at a given firm and is referred to as an “ability” in this study. Due to such additional
uncertainty, it becomes more difficult for the principal to assign the correct task. This
makes it more likely for the principal to choose output-based compensation. However,
the principal can infer the realized values match parameters by observing output yti
over time. This means that overall uncertainty decreases over time. Our idea to show
a negative relationship between incentive and tenure is as follows. Suppose that, upon
hiring a new agent, uncertainty is high enough for the principal to choose output-based
compensation. By observing output over time, the principal’s uncertainty about the
agent decreases over time. If the uncertainty decreases sufficiently, the principal may
switch to input-based compensation later in the agent’s tenure. Since input-based com-
pensation is less incentive-intensive, this shows a negative relationship between tenure
and incentive. We formalize such an argument in this section.
We keep the assumption that once the agent is hired, he or she is hired forever. The
principal hires an agent to undertake one of two possible tasks. At the beginning of
the period, the principal and agent jointly draw match parameters for each task. θi is
the match parameter for task i, i=1, 2. The match parameters are assumed to be time
invariant. At period t, the output when the agent performs task i is given by
yti = θi + ρti + eti (24)
We assume that match parameters are drawn independently from the same distribution
N(µ, σ2). All other settings are the same as the simplest model described in Section 6.
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To simplify the notation, let
Xti = θi + ρti (25)
By the independence assumption of θi and ρti, and by the fact that the principal does not
observe the realized value of both parameters, the principal perceives Xti as a random
variable drawn from N(µ, σ2 + τ 2).
6.1 Optimal input-based contract at period 0
At the beginning of the period, there is no previous information about the match para-
meters. The principal’s problem is to solve the following.
max
e0i, w(e0i),i=1,2
E[X0i + e0i − C(e0i)]−me (26)
s.t
w(e0i)− C(e0i) ≥ 0 (27)
The constraint binds, i.e., w(e0i) = C(e0i). The principal, then, chooses the optimal
effort level by maximizing
E [X0i + e0i]− C(e0i)−me (28)
The optimal level of effort is again given by e∗, the solution to C ′(e∗) = 1. Since both
X01 and X02 have the same distribution, the principal randomly chooses between two
tasks. The sum of the surpluses for principal and agent is given by
µ+ e∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2 (29)
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6.2 Optimal output contract at period 0
Since this is the initial period, there is no previous information about θi. Due to the risk
neutrality assumption, the principal “sells” the firm at a fixed price α0. The output-
based contract is of the form, w0i = y0i − α0. The agent’s problem is given by
max
ei, i=1,2
[X0i + ei − α0 − C(ei) +Bi] (30)
Clearly, the optimal effort is e∗, the solution to C ′(e) = 1. The agent chooses the task
that maximizes X0i + e
∗ − α0 − C(e∗) + Bi. Again, we assume that Bi is so small that
the agent ignores the private benefit upon choosing a task, i.e., the agent choose a task
so as to maximize θi + ρi.
Let Z0 = min{X01, X02}. At the time of the contract, both the principal and the
agent do not observe θi and ρi. Thus both the principal and the agent perceive Z0 as the
second order statistic of two independent samples from N(µ, σ2 + τ 2). Thus the output
is a random variable given by y0i = Z0 + e0i for both the principal and the agent at the
time of the contract. At the optimal contract, the participation constraint binds. The
optimal value of α0 can be found by solving the following.
E(Z0 + e
∗)− α0 − C(e∗) = 0
=⇒
α0 = µ+
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
+ e∗ − C(e∗) (31)
The sum of the surpluses for both the principal and the agent is given by
µ+
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
+ e∗ − C(e∗)−my + B
2
(32)
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6.3 The Condition where output-based compensation is prefer-
able at period 0
By comparing (29) and (32), the condition in which the output-based compensation is
preferred at period t=0 is given by
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
≥ my −me (33)
Again the decision of whether the principal chooses output-based compensation or input-
based compensation depends on the level of uncertainty. However for this case, the
uncertainty stems not only from the riskiness of the task τ but also from the uncertainty
about the agent’s ability σ. The more uncertain the principal is about the agent’s ability,
the greater the likelihood that the principal chooses output-based compensation.
The condition (33) is indicative of the principal’s decision for later periods. Notice
that the principal can infer the realized value of θi by repeatedly observing the out-
put over time. This reduces the uncertainty stemming from the match parameters for
later periods. This in turn makes it likely that the principal will switch to input-based
compensation later on. To make this point clear, let us assume that
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
≥ my −me (34)√
σ2
pi
< my −me (35)
The condition (34) means that at the beginning of the period, the principal always prefer
output based compensation. The condition (35) means that if there is no uncertainty
in the agent’s ability, the principal always prefers input-based compensation. This is
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the most interesting case since, if condition (34) is not satisfied, the principal chooses
input-based compensation upon hiring the agent. Since uncertainty does not increase
in our setting, for all the remaining period, the principal continues to choose input-
based compensation. If condition (35) is not satisfied, the uncertainty of the business
enviroment is so large, that even if the principal knows the agent’s ability with certainty,
the principal chooses output-based compensation at any period.
Our idea to show the inverse relationship between incentive and tenure is the fol-
lowing. As the principal repeatedly observe output over time, the uncertainty about
the agent’s ability (expressed by σ) decreases over time, reducing overall uncertainty.
Therefore, it is more likely for the principal to choose input based compensation later
in the agent’s tenure.
6.4 Condition where output-based and input-based compensa-
tion in period 1
In period 1, the principal observes the output in the previous period, t=0. The principal
has updated his belief about the distribution of θi. Let k0 =
σ2
σ2+τ2
. If the agent chooses
task i in the previous period, the conditional distribution of θi is given by
[θi|θi + ρ0i + e∗ = y0] ∼ N [µ+ k0(y0 − µ), k0σ2] (36)
and if the agent did not choose task i in the previous period, the conditional distribution
of θi is given by
[θi|θi + ρ0i + e∗ ≤ y0] (37)
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∼ 1
Φ( y√
σ2+τ2
)
∫ t
∞
[1− Φ(θi − y
τ
)]
1√
2piσ2
exp[−1
2
(θi − µ)2
σ2
]dθi (38)
6.5 Optimal input-based compensation for period 1
At the beginning of period 1, the principal has already observed which task the agent
chose in period 0, as well as the realized output y0i0 = θi0 +ρ0i0 + e
∗. i0 denotes the task
that the agent chose in period t = 0. Given this information, the principal’s problem
for input-based compensation is the following.
max
e1i,w(e1i), i=1,2
E[θi + ρ1i + e1i|y0i0 ]− w(e1i)−me (39)
s.t
w(e1i)− C(e1i) ≥ 0 (40)
The participation constraint binds so that, again the optimal effort level is e∗. Notice
that
E[θi + ρ1i + e
∗|y0i0 ]− w(e∗)−me (41)
= E[θi + ρ1i|y0i0 ] + e∗ − w(e∗)−me (42)
= E[θi|θi0 + ρ0i0 + e∗] + e∗ − w(e∗)−me (43)
where E[θi|θi0 + ρ0i0 + e∗] should be understood as the shorthand notation of E[θi|θi0 +
ρ0i0 + e
∗ = y0i0 ] if i = i0 and E[θi|θi0 + ρ0i0 + e∗ ≤ y0i0 ] if i 6= i0.
We introduce a new notation. Let θ1i ∼ [θi|y0i0 ], i.e., θ1i is a random variable having
the distribution given by (36) or (37) depending on wether i = i0 or i 6= i0 respectively.
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Now, let S1 = max{[E[θ11 + ρ11], E[θ12 + ρ12]}. For input based compensation, the
principal assigns a task that has higher expected output. Thus, the sum of the expected
surplus of the principal and the agent is
S1 + e
∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2 (44)
6.6 Optimal output based compensation at t=1:
For an output based contract, because of risk neutrality, the wage offer has the following
form, w1i = y1i − α1. α1 is the price at which the principal “sells” the firm. Using the
same argument as t=0, we can see that the agent chooses the effort level equal to e∗ and
chooses the task that has a higher output level.
The agent has observed the realized value of θ1 and θ2 in the initial period t=0.
Therefore, at t=1, the match parameters are known to the agent. On the other hand,
the principal only has information about the distribution of these parameters conditional
on the previous period’s output. This implies that there is information asymmetry at the
time of the contract. The principal has to choose the optimal α1 given this information
asymmetry. This causes the following problems. The principal set the optimal price at
which he or she sells the firm to the agent (α1) by making the participation constraint
binding, i.e., E[y1i − α1 − C(e1i)] = 0. Because of the information asymmetry, the
expectation with respect to the principal’s information is different from the expectation
with respect to the agent’s information. Optimal α1 with respect to the principal’s
information may be too small (constraint is slack) or may be too large (constraint is
violated) with respect to the agent’s information. It is in general impossible to always
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make the participation constraint binding. We find that characterizing the optimal α1
that takes into account such information asymmetry difficult. Therefore, we simply
assume that the agent chooses α1 by satisfying the following.
E[max{θ11 + ρ11, θ12 + ρ12}] + e∗ − α1 − C(e∗) = 0 (45)
=⇒
α1 = E[max{θ11 + ρ11, θ12 + ρ12}] + e∗ − C(e∗) (46)
In other words, we assume that the principal chooses α1 as if the agent did not know the
matching parameters. α1 computed this way can be understood as an approximation to
the true optimal α1 that takes into account the information asymmetry. If the principal’s
uncertainty about the agent’s ability is small, this should be a good approximation.
Based on this approximation, the sum of the expected surplus for both the principal
and the agent is given by
E[max{θ11 + ρ11, θ12 + ρ12}] + e∗ − C(e∗) +B/2 (47)
6.7 Condition where the output based contract is preferred at
period 1
This is given by
E[max{θ11 + ρ11, θ12 + ρ12}]− S1 > my −me (48)
Proposition 1 The principal is more likely to choose input based compensation at t=1,
that is
E[max{θ11 + ρ11, θ12 + ρ12}]− S1 <
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
(49)
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Proof See Appendix C
Therefore, in the period t=1, the principal is more likely to use input-based com-
pensation. The intuition is that, in the period 1, the principal has observed the output
in the previous period and has a better idea about the agent’s ability, decreasing the
principal’s overall uncertainty about the business outcome. Reduced uncertainty makes
it more likely for the principal to choose input-based compensation.
6.8 Condition where output-based compensation is preferred
at period t
We assume that the principal chooses output-based compensation until the (t-1)-th
period. Let y0i0 , . . . , yt−1it−1 be the the history of outputs observed by the principal. is
is the task chosen by the agent at period s. The distribution of θi conditional on the
output history is given by
Fti(x) = P (θi ≤ x|y0i0 , . . . , yt−1it−1) (50)
This notation needs explanation. Fix i at period t. Continue to use the notation is
to denote the task chosen at period s. If i = is, then the notation P (θi ≤ x|ysis)
means P (θi ≤ x|θis + ρsis + e∗ = ysis). If i 6= is, the notation P (θi ≤ x|ysis) means
P (θi ≤ x|θis + ρsis + e∗ ≤ ysis). Let θti be a random variable having distribution given
by Fti in (50). In other words, θti is the principal’s updated belief about θi given the
history of output.
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6.9 Input-based compensation in period t
Input-based compensation is to assign a task with higher expected value of θi + ρti.
Expectation is taken conditional on information about the history of output. The agent
chooses effort equal to e∗. Let St = max{E[θt1 + ρt1], E[θt2 + ρt2]}. The total surplus of
input based compensation is given by
St + e
∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2 (51)
6.10 Output-based compensation at period t
Because of risk neutrality, the optimal output-based compensation is wit = yit−αt where
αt is the price at which the principal “sells” the firm to the agent. Using exactly the
same logic as t=1, we can show that the agent chooses the optimal effort e∗ and chooses
the task that maximizes the output.
There is again a problem of information asymmetry in choosing the optimal αt. As
in the case for t=1, we assume that the principal chooses αt by binding the participation
constraint with respect to the principal’s information, and that the agent accepts the
offer.
E[max{θt1 + ρt1, θt2 + ρt2}] + e∗ − αt − C(e∗) = 0 (52)
=⇒
αt = E[max{θt1 + ρt1, θt2 + ρt2}] + e∗ − C(e∗) (53)
Expectation is taken conditional on the information held by the principal. The sum of
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the expected surpluses for both the principal and the agent is given by
E[max{θt1 + ρt1, θt2 + ρt2}] + e∗ − C(e∗) +B/2 (54)
6.11 The relationship between incentive and tenure
By comparing the surplus for input based compensation (51) and the surplus for output-
based compensation (54), the condition in which output-based compensation is preferred
at period t is given by
E[max{θt1 + ρt1, θt2 + ρt2}]− St > my −me (55)
Now, the following proposition shows that incentive decreases with tenure.
Proposition 2 Under the following conditions,
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
≥ my −me (56)√
τ 2
pi
< my −me (57)
the principal chooses output-based compensation upon hiring a new agent, then switch
to input-based compensation later on after observing the output for a sufficient number
of periods.
Proof See Appendix (D)
Since input-based compensation is less incentive intensive compensation, this propo-
sition shows that incentive decreases with tenure under conditions (56) and (57). This
proposition also suggests that in general, incentive is non-increasing in tenure. To see
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this, notice that if condition (56) is not met, the principal chooses input-based com-
pensation upon hiring a new agent. Since uncertainty is non-increasing, the principal
continues to choose input-based compensation at any period. Thus, incentive is un-
changed over time. If condition (57) is not met, even if the principal knows the agent’s
ability with certainty, he or she chooses output-based compensation. Again, incentive is
unchanged over time.
7 Incorporating turnover
So far we have assumed that once the agent is hired, he or she works forever at the firm.
We will now relax this assumption by introducing turnover into the model. We consider
a three-stage model. The first stage is the pre-contractual period. The principal and
agent jointly draw match parameters and make an employment agreement. The second
stage is the end of the initial period, where both agent have observed the initial period
output. In the second stage, the principal decides whether or not to retain the agent.
If the principal retains the agent, the principal makes the decision about whether to
choose input-based compensation or output-based compensation. If the principal fires
the agent, the principal finds a new agent (the principal goes back to the first stage).
The third stage is the end of the second period. We assume that at the third stage, the
true values of the match parameters are revealed. In this stage, the principal also makes
the decision about whether to retain the agent or not. If the decision is to retain the
agent, he or she also chooses the type of compensation. We can find decision rules for
the principal by solving the problem backwards.
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7.1 The Decision rule at the third stage:
Let Q be the pre-draw value and J3 be the value function of the principal at the third
stage. In this stage, the realized values of the match parameters are revealed. If the
principal retains the agent at this stage, the agent will be hired forever. Furthermore, if
the principal retains the CEO, by the assumptions (44) and (45), the principal always
chooses input based compensation. The present discounted value of the total surplus is
1
1−β [m2+ e
∗−C(e∗)−me+B/2] where β is the discount factor. If the principal decides
to fire the agent, the principal goes back to the first stage and finds a new agent. The
principal’s value when finding a new agent is Q. The value function at the third stage
is written as
J3(m2) = max{ 1
1− β [m2 + e
∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2], Q} (58)
where m2 = E[θ1 + ρ21, θ2 + ρ22]. Notice that,
1
1−β [m2 + e
∗ − C(e∗) −me + B/2] is an
increasing function in m2 whereas Q is constant. Therefore, the decision rule for the
principal is the following.
Keep the agent if m2 ≥ m2
Find a new agent if m2 < m2
where m2 satisfies
1
1− ρ [m2 + e
∗ − C(e∗)−me +B/2] = Q
If the realized ability is too low to meet the threshold value m2, the principal fires the
agent and find a new agent. Otherwise, the principal retains the agent forever.
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7.2 The decision rule at the second stage
In the second stage, the principal has seen the output of the initial period. First, consider
the value when the principal’s decision is to retain the agent. Let i0 denotes the task
that the agent has chosen at t = 0. The principal makes a decision about whether
to retain the agent at this stage. If the decision is to retain the agent, the principal
also chooses either input-based compensation of output-based compensation. Note that,
given the decision of the principal to retain the agent, the decision rule for choosing
between input-based compensation and output-based compensation is the same as the
case in which we do not have turnover in the model. Therefore, the introduction of
turnover in the model does not alter the result that the principal is more likely to choose
input based compensation when uncertainty is small. Since the uncertainty about the
agent’s ability is smaller in the second stage than in the initial stage, the principal is
more likely to choose input-based compensation in the second stage than in the initial
stage. This still suggests a negative relationship between incentive and uncertainty.
If the principal chooses input-based compensation, the surplus is given by equation
(51). S1 in the equation is a function of y0i0 = θi0 + ρ1i0 . Let ve(y0i0) be the surplus
at t=1 for input-based compensation. The surplus at t=1 when choosing output based
compensation is given by equation (54). Again, this is a function of y0i0 . Let ve(y0i0)
and vy(y0i0) be the surplus for input-based and output-based compensation respectively.
The present discounted value given the decision to retain the agent is thus given by
max[ve(y0i0), vy(y0i0)] + βE[J3(m2)]
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.Therefore, the value function at the second stage J2 is a function of y0i0 , given by
J2(y0i0) = max{max[ve(y0i0), vy(y0i0) + βE[J3(m2)], Q} (59)
Both ve(y0i0) and vy(y0i0) are increasing functions in y0i0 . The decision rule for the
principal at the second stage is given the
Keep the CEO if y0i0 ≥ y1
Find a new CEO if y0i0 < y1
where y1 satisfies max[ve(y1), vy(y1)] + βE[J3(m2)] = Q
7.3 Value in the initial stage:
In the initial stage, due to assumptions (56) and (57), the principal chooses output-based
compensation. The value Q is thus given by
Q = µ+
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
+ e∗ − C(e∗)−my + B
2
+ βE[J2(y0)] (60)
The value functions as a whole depends on all the parameters in the equation such as
σ and τ . Given specific values of the parameters, Q can be computed by a recursive
method using equations (58), (59) and (60).
Incorporating turnover in the model does not alter the most important result -that
incentive decreases with tenure. This is because at each time period, the principal
chooses between input-based and output-based compensation according to the rules
given by equation (55) conditional on the decision of the principal to retain the agent.
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Introduction of turnover merely adds an extra layer to the principal’s decision, i.e., to
decide whether to retain the CEO or not. In addition, the model suggests that a better
performance leads to a lower likelihood of CEO turnover.
8 Implication of the model
We conclude this study by summarizing the implication of our model.
Incentives are non-increasing with tenure If condition (56) and (57) are satisfied,
the principal chooses output-based compensation upon hiring a new agent but switches
to input-based compensation later in the agent’s tenure. This shows a negative relation-
ship between incentive and tenure. If conditions (56) and (57) are not met, incentive
is unchanged over time. Thus our model suggests that incentive is non-increasing with
tenure.
2. Incentives increase with the uncertainty about the agent’s ability: If the
principal’s uncertainty about the agent’s ability is high, the principal is likely to choose
output-based compensation, suggesting that there should be a positive relationship be-
tween incentive and uncertainty about the agent’s ability. If we can find a proxy variable
for such uncertainty, we can potentially test this hypothesis. For example, consider CEO
compensation. It is reasonable to assume that a CEO’s managerial ability is known with
greater certainty if the number of years worked by the CEO at the company prior to
becoming a CEO is large. In other words, the number of years worked prior to becoming
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a CEO serves as a proxy for prior knowledge about the CEO’s ability held by the share-
holders and the board of directors. We can potentially test this implication by testing
the relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity and years worked by the CEO
prior to becoming a CEO.
3. Incentives are non-decreasing with uncertainty in which the firm operates:
This result is from Prendergast (2002) and is the main result on which our model is based.
If we find a proxy variable for such uncertainty, we can potentially test this hypothesis.
For CEO compensation, the R&D to the book value of asset ratio has been used to
proxy for such uncertainty. For example, see Garen (1994).
9 Conclusion
Although standard principal-agent theories imply that incentive intensity of compen-
sation increases with tenure, prior empirical work of the relationship between pay-for-
performance sensitivity in CEO compensation consistently finds a negative relationship.
This becomes our motivation to develop a model that is consistent with the prior empiri-
cal findings on the relationship between incentive and tenure. Our model is an extension
of Prendergast’s (2002) which shows a positive relationship between incentive and tenure.
We introduced additional uncertainty to Prendergast’s model, i.e., the principal’s un-
certainty about the agent’s ability. The CEO’s ability is gradually revealed over time,
decreasing the principal’s uncertainty of the business outcome. Assuming Prendergast
result, we show that the principal is more likely to choose input-based compensation
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for CEO’s with longer tenure because of the reduced uncertainty. This suggests a neg-
ative relationship between incentive and tenure. These implications of the model can
be tested using CEO compensation data. In addition to the negative relationship be-
tween incentive and tenure, this model also implies that incentive is non-increasing in
the uncertainty about the agent’s ability, and that incentive is non-increasing in the
uncertainty in which the firm operates.
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Chapter 3
Empirical investigation of the relationship between tenure and
incentive using CEO compensation data
1 Introduction
Many prior studies relate CEO compensation and principal-agent theories whereby
principal-agent theories have been supported. However, one of the standard results
of principal agent theories that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with tenure as
CEO has not been supported by empirical studies. Murphy (1986) uses CEO compensa-
tion data between 1974 and 1984 and finds that pay-for-performance sensitivity is smaller
for CEOs whose tenure is greater than 4.6 years than for CEOs with shorter tenure. This
result means that pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases with CEO tenure, a result
which contradicts the standard principal-agent theories. Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
also use CEO compensation data between 1971 and 1989 and similarly find that pay-
for-performance sensitivity decreases as CEO tenure increases, contradicting standard
principal-agent theories.
Such results leave us unsure if CEO compensation is consistent with standard prin-
cipal agent theories. In fact, I show in Chapter 2 that pay-for-performance sensitivity
may be non-increasing with tenure as CEO. This model is an extension of Prendergast
(2002) and is referred to as “extended-Prendergast” model in this study. There are two
econometric problems in the previous studies by Murphy (1985) and Gibbons
and Murphy (1992). First, their studies do not include stock option grants in the total
compensation; therefore, a major part of the incentive effect may be missing from their
results. Second, their studies ignore selection biases: Since turnover of CEO is common
place, for each period, we only observe CEOs who survive up to that period. Ignoring
such facts potentially causes selection biases. Since tenure and incentive could have a
negative relationship, and since prior studies have econometric problems, it is worthwhile
to re-examine the tenure-incentive relationship.
We seek to make the following contributions. (1) This study examines the relation-
ship between pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO tenure using more recent CEO
compensation data. CEO tenure is the number of years as CEO. (2) We estimate such a
relationship by estimating a joint system of equations that incorporate unobserved het-
erogeneity, which controls for selection biases. (3) This studies serves as a test of wether
CEO compensation is explained by standard principal-agent theories or explained better
by the “extended-Prendergast model” described in Chapter 2. In doing so, we also ex-
amine two additional relationships: (a) incentive and uncertainty about the managerial
ability of CEOs, and (b) incentive and riskiness of the environment in which the firm
operates. Standard principal-agent theories predict that we find a positive relationship
for (a) and a negative relationship for (b). Our “extended-Prendergast” model predicts
the opposite. (a) is tested by examining the relationship between pay-for-performance
sensitivity and the number of years worked at the firm prior to becoming a CEO. (b)
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is tested by examining the relationship between pay-for-performance and R&D to asset
ratio. Rationale of the methods for these tests is explained in Section 3.
To preview the results, we find that there is a strong and positive relationship be-
tween pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO tenure. For CEOs with tenure fewer
than or equal to six years, an improvement in firm performance from the median level
to the 75th percentile level would only lead to a 0.06% increase in total compensation.
On the other hand, for CEOs with tenure longer than or equal to seven years, the same
improvement in total compensation would lead to an 8% increase in total compensation.
This is strong support for standard principal-agent theories like Gibbons and Murphy’s
(1999), but rejects our ”extended-Prendergast” model. For the additional test (a) we
find little evidence of the existence of the relationship between pay-for-performance sen-
sitivity and years worked prior to becoming CEOs. For the additional test (b), we did
not find evidence of the existence of the relationship between pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity and R&D to asset ratio. These additional tests do not provide further evidence to
support or reject both standard principal-agent theories and our “extended-Prendergast”
model.
2 Theories and prior empirical studies
Murphy (1986) characterizes the incentive contract for CEOs in a multi-period principal-
agent setting. In his model, the agent works for a fixed number of periods. His model
implies that pay rise is spread evenly throughout the remaining years, i.e., good per-
formance is rewarded as a shift in the earning-tenure profile. This, in turn, implies
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that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with tenure because, for later years, the
reward is spread among fewer years. Thus, the same increase in output causes greater
increase in annual compensation.14 The econometric model is ∆ln(Salary+Bonus)it =
α+β(Y ears as CEO)+δ(Rate of return on common equity)it+it. Murphy uses CEO
compensation data between 1974 and 1984. He divides the data into three sub-samples;
the first sub-samples are for CEOs with tenure of 4.6 and less, the second sub-samples
are for CEOs with tenure between 4.6 and 9.9 and the third sub-samples are for CEOs
with tenures greater than 9.9. Murphy finds that δ is smaller for those with longer
tenure. Thus, the estimated results show that pay-for-performance actually decreases
with tenure, which is inconsistent with standard results of principal-agent theories.15
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) develop a model that characterizes the incentive con-
tract when the agent has reputational career concern. In their model, good current
performance positively affects the CEO’s assessed ability, as assessed by the sharehold-
ers. The assessed ability is interpreted as “reputation” of the CEO. A good reputation
about a CEO’s ability causes an increase in his or her future compensation, thus creating
incentives for CEOs to exert effort even without an explicit incentive contract. How-
ever, the reputational concern disappears as the CEO reaches his or her retirement. To
supplement such a loss in incentive, firms may intensify pay-for-performance sensitivity
as the CEO approaches his or her retirement. Gibbons and Murphy’s model has two
implications: (i) Pay-for-performance sensitivity increases as CEOs reach their retire-
14Therefore, the implication that pay-for-performance increases with tenure depends on the finiteness of a CEO’s
lifetime.
15They conclude that those results are supported by learning model instead.
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ment, holding CEO tenure constant. (ii) Pay-for-performance sensitivity increases as
CEO tenure increases, holding years to retirement constant. The second implication is
relevant for our study.
The reason for the second implication is as follows. First, because of the agent’s risk
aversion, the standard trade-off between incentive and uncertainty holds, i.e., pay-for-
performance sensitivity decreases with uncertainty of business performance. Suppose
that the firm’s output is given by yt = η + at + t where η is an unobservable ability of
a CEO (unobservable both by CEOs and the shareholders), at is the effort and t is the
usual independent random shocks. Notice that there are two sources of uncertainty to
both shareholders and the CEO, η and t. Although η is not directly observable (both
by the shareholders and by the CEO), it can be inferred by repeatedly observing the
firm’s output over time. Because the uncertainty about the ability of the CEO decreases
over time, so does the overall uncertainty of business outcome diminish. By the inverse
relationship between incentive and uncertainty, the Gibbons and Murphy show that
pay-for-performance sensitivity should increase with tenure.
Their econometric model to test the pay-for-performance tenure relationship is the
following. ∆(Salary + Bonuses)it = β1(low tenure dummy) × ∆ln(Firm V alue)it +
∑1988
n=1972 βn(n
th year dummyit) × ∆ln(Firm value)it + β′(other variables)it. The the-
ory predicts that β1 is negative, reflecting the negative relationship between pay-for-
performance sensitivity and CEO tenure. They used CEO compensation data between
1971 and 1989 to estimate this model. They find a positive but statistically insignificant
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coefficient. Thus the implication of their theory that incentive and uncertainty has pos-
itive relationship is not strongly supported by the data. Nonetheless, he finds evidence
that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases as the agent reaches his or her retirement,
although the magnitude of increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity is surprisingly
small. For the CEOs with cash earning of $562,000, a 10% change in shareholders
wealth corresponds to $7,300 of CEO ’s wealth change for CEOs more than three years
from retirement, but $9,500 for CEOs fewer than thee years to retirement.
Note again that the basic reason why pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with
tenure in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) is because of the standard inverse relationship
between incentive and risk. Contrary to such standard results, Prendergast (2002) shows
that, under some conditions, pay-for-performance sensitivity is non-decreasing with un-
certainty. In his model, uncertainty dictates if the principal chooses “input-based com-
pensation” or “output-based compensation”. For input-based compensation, the agent
is rewarded by his or her input, i.e., if he or she is keeping busy. On the other hand,
output-based compensation ties the compensation to the output, i.e., the firm’s value.
It is assumed that making output-based compensation incurs a fixed cost to the firm so
that the firm wants to avoid output-based compensation if necessary. Assuming that
the agent observes the business environment better than the principal, if the uncertainty
of the business environment is significant, the principal delegates the decision making
power to the agent. However, to keep the agent from abusing the delegated power, the
principal uses output-based compensation. In other words, under greater uncertainty,
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the benefit of delegating decision making power to the agent exceeds the cost of making
output-based compensation. If the business environment is less uncertain, the principal
keeps the decision making power to himself or herself and uses input-based compensa-
tion. Since output-based compensation ties compensation to output, we are likely to
observe greater pay-for-performance sensitivity when uncertainty is large.
In Chapter 2, we extended the Prendergast model to a multi-period setting. We
also incorporate a matching theory to his model. Basic intuition of our “extended-
Prendargast Model” is simple: Uncertainty regarding the outcome of the business stems
not only from the business environment but also from uncertainty regarding the CEO’s
ability. The CEO’s ability is gradually revealed over time, thus decreasing the uncer-
tainty of the business outcome. Using Prendergast’s argument, we can show that the
principal is more likely to use output-based compensation earlier in the CEO’s tenure.
This suggests a negative relationship between tenure and incentive.
In summary, standard principal-agent theories like Gibbons and Murphy’s imply
that there should be a positive relationship between tenure and pay-for-performance
sensitivity. On the other hand, the extended-Prendargast model implies that pay-for-
performance sensitivity is non-decreasing with tenure.
3 Testable implications
As is noted, the main objective of our study is to estimate the relationship between
pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO tenure using the most recent CEO compen-
sation data. Examination of relevant literature in Section 2 reveals additional testable
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implications of principal agent theories, which are summarized in the this section.
1. Incentive and tenure: Standard principal-agent theories predict that pay-for-
performance sensitivity increases with CEO tenure. On the other hand, our extented-
Prendergast model predicts that pay-for-performance sensitivity is non-increasing with
tenure.
2. Incentive and the uncertainty about managerial ability: Standard principal-
agent model implies that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases if the uncertainty
about the managerial ability of the CEO decreases. On the other hand, our extended-
Prendergast model implies that pay-for-performance sensitivity is non-increasing with
uncertainty about the agent’s managerial ability, because greater uncertainty about the
CEO’s managerial ability is likely to make the principal choose output-based compen-
sation.
It seems reasonable to assume that the managerial ability of CEOs is known with
greater certainty if the number of years worked at the company prior to becoming a
CEO is greater. In other words, the number of years worked prior to becoming a CEO
serves as a proxy for prior knowledge held by the shareholders and the board of directors
about CEO’s managerial ability. Therefore, we can potentially test this implication by
testing the relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity and years worked prior
to becoming a CEO.
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3. Incentive and riskiness of the business environment: Standard principal-
agent models imply that there is a negative relationship between pay-for-performance
sensitivity and the riskiness of the environment in which the firm operates. On the other
hand, our model predicts that pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases with risk. To
test this, we need a proxy variable for the risk. The proxy variable that we use is R&D
to the book value of asset ratio. The rationale for the choice is presented in Section 4.
4 Definitions of our key variables
To test the three implications described in the previous section, we start by defining
total compensation, the proxy for the firm performance variable, and the proxy variable
for the riskiness of the environment under which the firm operates.
Total compensation: Both Murphy (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) use
(Salary + Bonuses) as the CEO compensation variable, thus omitting stock based com-
pensation such as stock options. This is because, their compensation data is from Fobes
Executive compensation survey, which does not have information about stock option
grants. Instead, we use ExecComp as the main data source, which has a detailed break
down of the entire compensation package, including Black-Sholes Value of stock options.
Since the stock options are the largest components of CEO annual compensation, we
define total compensation as the sum of salary, bonuses and Black-Sholes values of stock
options.16
16We include stock appreciation rights into the stock options.
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There are several advantages in defining total compensation this way. First, salary,
bonuses and stock options are the three components of CEO compensation package that
attract the most attention in the executive compensation literature. Second, these three
components make up approximately 90% of the whole compensation package for each
year of our sample. By focusing on these three components, we can eliminate relatively
minor components such as severance pay which may be influenced by factors other than
firm performance variables.
Firm performance: Our firm performance variable is the change in firm values nor-
malized by the end of the year firm value, given by the formula below.
(Perform)it =
(firm value)it − (firm value)it−1 + (divident payout)
(firm value)it
(61)
We also include dividend payout since shareholders are rewarded not only by increases
in firm values but also by dividend payout. As is clear from the definition, this variable
captures the values added to the firm by the CEO for each year. This definition has
the following attractive feature: if we estimate a linear relationship of the following
(Total comp)t = αt + βt(Perform)t, the total compensation increases (decreases) only
when the firm value increases (decreases), which is consistent with standard principal-
agent theories.
Our definition of firm performance deviates from the proxy variable used by Gib-
bons and Murphy (1992). Gibbons and Murphy use end-of-year firm value as the firm
performance variable. A problem associated with this definition is that firm values tend
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to be large for large size firms and large size firms tend to pay large amounts. Therefore,
if we regress the firm performance against the total compensation using Gibbons and
Murphy’s definition, we may pick up the firm size effect instead of the pay-performance
relationship. Our definition, on the other hand, avoids such problems since our perfor-
mance variable is a “normalized change”.
To construct this performance variable, we need firm value information for two
consecutive periods. Thus, for each CEO, (Perform)it is available only after the second
period. This means that we discard CEOs who quit at the end of their first year.
This potentially causes selection biases at the initial year, a problem addressed in our
econometric models.
Proxy variable for uncertainty: To proxy for the uncertainty of business outcome,
we use the ratio of R&D to the book value of assets. As Garen (1994) notes, the nature
of R&D is that the outcome of the investment is less certain. Therefore, R&D to asset
ratio can be used to proxy the riskiness of business outcome.
It should be noted that considerable number of firms do not report R&D figures. We
assume that those firms do not make R&D expenditure. This is a standard assumption
in the literature. For example, Garen (1992) and Bizjak et al. (1991) assume non-
reporting R&D as zero. This assumptions can be justified since many firms who do not
report such expenditures are firms that are not known as research intensive industries,
such as retail or restaurant industries.
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5 Data
This section first describe the data, then describes the sample criteria.
5.1 Data descriptions
Our data set is from ExecuComp and Compustat published by Standard and Poors.
ExecuComp covers detailed information about the five most highly paid executives in
each company within the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 firms.
My study focuses on compensation only of CEOs. The sample covers the years 1993
to 2003. All the compensation figures in my study are deflated by the Consumer Price
Index, with year 2003 as the base year.
The yearly average of total compensation is seen in Table 16. Again, the total
compensation is defined as the sum of salary, bonuses and Black-Sholes values of stock
options. The increase from 1993 to 2000 is rather dramatic. The average total compen-
sation in 1993 is $1.93 million. This figure nearly quadrupled to $6.66 million in year
2000. However, average total compensation declined after year 2000. In fact, this is
the year in which the information technology industry stock “bubble” burst. Table 17
shows the yearly averages separately for the three components. As can be seen, the value
of stock options increases substantially to reach a peak in year 2000 and then declines
sharply. Both salary and bonus show modest but steady increases through the whole
sample period.
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5.2 Sample Criteria
We treat each CEO-firm combination as a unique CEO. We also require that each
individual became a CEO on or after year 1993, the year our sample period began, so
that there are no left censored observations in our sample. The exclusion of the left
censored observations is to eliminate the possibly severe left censoring biases.
After eliminating observations that do not match our sample criteria, we obtain an
unbalanced panel data set that contains 3031 CEO-years of observation including 1075
corporations and 1450 CEOs from 1993 to 2003.
5.3 A note on CEO age
The CEO age variable needs some explanation. We found that the age variable in Ex-
ecComp (p age 2) extremely incomplete. p age 2 shows the age of CEOs in the latest
Corporate Proxy files. In our data set, we have 1430 CEOs. Of them, the p age 2 is
missing for 1076 of these CEOs (76%). Moreover, the information is missing in non-
random way: average exit rate for the observations with missing ages is 0.13, while it is
0.019 for observations whose ages are not missing. Age information is crucial in examin-
ing the relationship between incentive and tenure since the omission of age will confuse
tenure effect with age effect. Thus, we hand-collected most of the age information. We
have checked proxy statements for each corporation to check the CEO’s age. As a re-
sult, among 1450 CEOs, we were able to collect age information for 1370 of them. Age
variable shows the age of CEOs when the proxy statements are filed. Corporate proxy
statements are available on line at Securities and Exchange Commission’s home page
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(http://www.sec.gov). Table 18 shows the average exit rate of CEO according to age.
As can be seen, the exit rate increases sharply at the age of 64.
5.4 A note on the construction of total compensation variable
Close examination of the ExecComp data set reveals that some CEOs do not quit at the
end of the financial years. Rather, some CEOs leave before completing the last fiscal
year. In such case, the CEO is rewarded for only a fraction of the fiscal year. However,
we would like to use the annual equivalent amount of total compensation. Therefore, we
adopt the following method of constructing the total compensation variable. Suppose we
observe a CEO quitting his or her job. First, we check the number of months the CEO
worked that year. If the number of months is equal or greater than 9 months, we compute
the annual equivalent of total compensation by dividing the original compensation figure
by (month worked)/12. If the number of months worked is fewer than 9, we disregard
the incomplete year, and take the previous year as the final year.
6 Econometric models
Gibbons and Murphy’s model (1993) assumes that CEO’s total compensation is a linear
function of firm performance. Thus, estimating the linear relationship of the following
is appropriate.
(Total Comp)it = constant+ β(Perform)it (62)
The “extended-Prendergast” model assumes that firm uses compensation contract of the
form, (total comp) = output − constant. This means that our model a priori assumes
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that β = 1. However, to empirically estimate the pay-for-performance relationship, let
us assume a linear relationship given by equation (62).
We estimate three models. Model 1 is our basic model where a single total compen-
sation equation is estimated using a fixed effect model. The problem associated with
Model 1 is that this does not control for selection biases. Model 2 deals with such a
problem by using a random effect model that includes two CEO turnover equations. Se-
lection biases occur due to correlations among error terms between total compensation
equation and the turnover equations. We include unobserved heterogeneity terms in the
model to deal with such correlations. By the construction of data, it is possible that
both Model 1 and Model 2 confound tenure effects with year effects as we only observe
long-tenure CEOs during the later years of the sample period. Model 3 elaborates Model
2 to separate tenure effects from year effects. At the end of this section, we detail our
choice of explanatory variables.
6.1 Model 1: Single equation fixed effect model
Our single equation fixed effect model is the following.
∆log(Total Compensation)it = (63)
+ β1∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}
+ β2∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}
+ β3∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6} × (years before CEO)
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+ β4∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11} × (years before CEO)
+ β5∆(Perform)it × (R&D Ratio)it
+ ∆Xotherit β
others + compi
i denotes individual CEO , t denotes tenure as CEO (CEO tenure) where t=1 is
the initial period and ∆ denotes the first difference. As is noted earlier, (Perform)it is
only available after the second period of tenure. This means that this regression discards
the first period observation. Since we eliminate all the left censored observations, the
maximum tenure is eleven.
To examine the relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO tenure,
we estimate separate pay-for-performance parameters, β1 for shorter CEO tenure (tenure
between 2 and 6), and β2 for longer CEO tenure (tenure between 7 and 11). Standard
principal-agent theories predict β1 < β2. Our “extended-Prendergast” model predicts
the opposite.
“Years before CEO” is a variable that shows the number of years the individual has
worked for the company prior to becoming a CEO. The coefficients for the interaction
terms between (Y ears before CEO)it and (Perform)it are used to examine the rela-
tionship between incentive and uncertainty about the CEO’s managerial ability (β3 and
β4). Again, we allow such uncertainty to have different impacts for shorter tenure and
longer tenure. This is because the effect of having prior knowledge of the CEO’s man-
agerial ability may diminish as more information about the managerial ability becomes
available as the CEO stays with the firm. If uncertainty about CEO ability negatively
97
affects pay-for-performance sensitivity like standard principal-agent theories, β3 and β4
should be positive. On the other hand, our “extended-Prendergast” model implies that
those coefficients should be non-positive.
β5 is the coefficient for the interaction term between return and R&D asset ratio.
Thus, β5 shows the relationship between incentive and uncertainty under which the firm
operates. Standard theories predict β5 to be negative while “extended-Prendergast”
model predicts β5 to be non-negative.
The problem with this model is selection biases. CEO Turnover is common; there-
fore, for each period, we observe individuals conditional on these CEOs not quitting up
to that period. This causes a potential selection biase. Moreover, we discard the first
period observation from this model since we do not have a (Perform)it variable until
the second period. This causes a initial period selection biase. Model 2 deals with such
selection biases using an unobserved heterogeneity model.
6.2 Model 2: Unobserved heterogeneity model to deal with
selection biases.
To address the problem associated with the selection biases, suppose that CEO turnover
is given by the following equation.
yit = α
′Zi + µit
where
CEO leaves at the end of the tth tenure if yit > 0
CEO stays if yit ≤ 0
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To obtain an unbiased estimate for β in equation (63), the error term should be un-
correlated with the explanatory variables. Let Xit be the vector of all the explanatory
variables in equation (63). Since we only use CEOs who survive up to period t, the
conditional expectation of the correlation between the error term and the explanatory
variables becomes
E[∆Xit · compit |αZit + µit ≤ 0] (64)
Assuming common variables exist between Xit and Zit, if 
comp and µit are correlated,
(64) may not be zero. Thus, OLS estimation of equation (63) would produce biased
results.
Correlation between the error terms is caused by the existence of unobserved het-
erogeneity: if there is an unobserved variable that affects both the total compensation
equation (63) and CEO turnover, the error terms will be correlated. The following model
deals with such correlations by explicitly incorporating an unobserved heterogeneity term
in the model.
Compensation equation : ∆log(Total Compensation)it = ∆X
′
itβ (65)
+(ρexitχi + 
comp
it )
Turnover equation : yit = Z
′
itα+ (ρ
exitχi + µit), t ≥ 2 (66)
Initial period turnover : yiniti = W
′
iθ + (ρ
initχi + µ
init
i ) (67)
This system of equations includes total compensation equation, CEO turnover equation
for tenure greater or equal to 2 , and initial period turnover equation.17 yit in the
17Total compensation equation is defined for t ≥ 3 due to the facts that we only have (Perform)it
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turnover equation (66) is a latent variable such that if yit > 0, the CEO exit at the end
of period t, and stay in the firm otherwise. We include (Perform)it in the turnover
equation, thus turnover equation is defined only for CEO tenure greater than 2. yiniti
in equation (67) is the latent variable such that if yiniti > 0, the CEO quits at the end
of initial period, and stay otherwise. µit and µ
init
i are assumed to be distributed as
standard logistic.
Turnover equation controls for the selection biases for t ≥ 2. As noted earlier,
by the construction of data, our total compensation equation discards the first period
observation. This causes potential selection biases at the initial period. Inclusion of the
initial period turnover equation controls for such biases.
We assume that compit ⊥mixit ⊥µit⊥µiniti . χi is a CEO-firm match specific unobserved
explanatory variables that is assumed to be distributed as standard normal. ρcomp, ρmix,
ρexit and ρinit are the factor loads. Since we do not observe χi, this is a part of the error
term in each equation. For instance, the error term in equation (65)is (ρmixχi+∆
mix
it ).
In other words, the correlation among error terms are captured by χi when factor loads
are not all equal to zero. Thus, inclusion of turnover equation controls for the selection
biases for the period t ≥ 2. The initial turnover equation controls for the selection
biases at the initial period. The estimation of the system of equations is by maximum
likelihood. The likelihood function can be found in Appendix ??.
from the second period and that we take the first difference.
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6.3 Model 3: Separating tenure effects from year effects
In both Model 1 and Model 2, we separately estimate pay-for-performance sensitivity for
CEOs with shorter tenure and for CEOs with longer tenure. A potential problem with
such method is that, the coefficients may pick up “year effects.” For example, suppose
that pay-for-performance sensitivity has systematically changed for all the firms after
the year 2000. By construction of the data, a considerable number of observations whose
CEO tenure is between 7 and 11 are in the period between year 2001 and 2003. Thus,
β1 and β2 may pick up such year effects rather than tenure effect.
The assumption that pay-for-performance sensitivity has changed after year 2000
is not unreasonable. As is described in Section 5, total compensation declines sharply
after year 2000. This year coincides with the IT industry bubble burst. It is likely that
such a drastic decline in total compensation is accompanied by a systematic change in
corporate governance. To separate tenure effects from potential year effects, we replace
the total compensation equation in (65) by the following equation.
∆log(Total Compensation)it = (68)
+ β11∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{1993≤year≤2000}
+ β12∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{2001≤year≤2003}
+ β21∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{1993≤year≤2000}
+ β22∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{2001≤year≤2003}
+ β31∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{1993≤year≤2000} × (years before CEO)
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+ β32∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{2001≤year≤2003} × (years before CEO)
+ β41∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{1993≤year≤2000} × (years before CEO)
+ β42∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{2001≤year≤2003} × (years before CEO)
+ β5∆(Perform)it × (R&D Ratio)it
+ ∆Xotherit β
others + compit
This means that for CEOs with shorter tenure, we estimate two separate pay-for-
performance parameters, β11 for early years (year between 1993 and 2000) and β21 for
late years (year between 2001 and 2003). Similarly, for longer tenure, we estimate two
separate pay-for-performance parameters, β12 for early years, and β22 for late years. By
comparing the pay-for-performance sensitivities for shorter tenure and longer tenure ei-
ther within early years or later years, we can avoid confounding tenure effects with year
effects.
6.4 Choice of explanatory variables
Table 4 is the complete list of our explanatory variables. ∆Xit for t ≥ 3 is the set of
variables used for total compensation equation (65)18. Wi is the variables for initial
turnover equation (67).
The set of variables used for the turnover equation (66), Zit, is [∆Xit, Xit, Xi2,Wi] for
t ≥ 2. ∆Xit at t=2 is set at zero in the turnover equation. There are three vectors of level
variables, Xit, Xi2 and Wi. We include Xit since CEO turnover is affected not only by
18Constant variables or variables whose first differences are collinear with the constant term are
omitted from ∆Xit.
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“growth” of these explanatory variables, but also by the level of those variables. Xi2 and
Wi are vectors of initial condition. variables.
19 By including initial condition variables,
we can incorporate total compensation and option mix in a reduced form specification.
Option mix is the proportion of stock options in the total compensation. In Chapter 1,
we show that total compensation and option mix are important determinants of CEO
turnover. See also Appendix ??.
Inclusion of some variables needs explanation. The market to book asset ratio is
commonly used as the proxy for growth opportunity for the following reason. The book
value of an asset can be interpreted as the value of an asset that is already in place. On
the other hand, market value of an asset is the value of an asset which will be in place
in the future plus the value already in place. Therefore, the market to book asset ratio
reflects the perceived growth opportunity of the firm. Since it is the perceived growth
opportunity of the firm, this would affect total compensation.
Sales are typically used as proxy for firm size. Larger size is typically associated
with greater compensation. Murphy (1985) shows the importance of controlling for the
firm size when estimating wage equation. Size of the firm may also affect the increase
in wage because managing a larger firm requires greater managerial skills, and to retain
the talent, the firm may have to compensate him with greater wage increase. Firm size
is also associated with greater scrutiny by media, which could affect the turnover of the
CEOs.
Dividend yield is an inverse proxy for the investment opportunity set. Firms with
19Since we include those initial condition variables, we set Xit equal to zero at t=2.
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high investment opportunity spend more money for investment, thus cash returned to
investors is typically small.
Macroeconomic trends also influence CEO compensation. For example, a good
macroeconomic condition would lead to greater CEO compensation. Therefore, we want
to control for such macroeconomic trends. One method is to include GDP figure. How-
ever, GDP figure may have different impacts for different industries. For example, an
increase in GDP and a subsequent increase in price level may have opposite effect on
export oriented industry and import oriented industry. Therefore, a better way to con-
trol for such trends is to incorporate the industry average of total compensation. Table
20 shows summary statistics of some of important variables.
7 Main empirical results
This section summarizes our empirical findings. We begin with general description of
our estimation results in Section 7.1, then analyze the relationship between incentive
and tenure in Section 7.2. In section 7.3, we interpret estimated pay-for-performance
parameters. Section 7.4 exhibits the results for the relationship between incentive and
uncertainty of the managerial ability of CEOs. This section also shows the results of the
relationship between incentive and the riskiness of the environment under which a firm
operates.
104
7.1 Estimation results across the models
Table 21 presents the estimated coefficients for the total compensation equation for
Model 1 (fixed effect model), Model 2 (heterogeneity model) and Model 3 (unobserved
heterogeneity model that separates year effects). The estimated coefficients for Model 1
and Model 2 are never substantially different from each other. In fact, the factor load for
the total compensation equation is not significantly different from zero at 5% confidence
level. Significant effects of heterogeneity only comes from the correlation between the
turnover equation (66) and initial turnover equation (67). Note that, Model 1 is nested
in Model 2 given the restriction that all the factor loads are equal to zero. However, χ2
test rejects such a hypothesis.20 This means that we reject Model 1 in favor of Model 2.
Note also that Model 2 is nested in Model 3 given the restriction that there are no year
effects. Thus, we base our analysis on Model 2 and Model 3 only.
7.2 Incentive-tenure relationship:
For Model 2, estimated pay-for-performance parameters appear to be much larger for
longer CEO tenure than shorter CEO tenure. β̂1 is 0.002 while β̂2 is 0.28. Hat is
a notation to indicate that it is an estimated coefficient. Although β̂1 appears to be
imprecisely estimated, β̂2 is still much larger than the upper bound of the 5% confidence
interval for β̂1. Thus, pay-for-performance sensitivity appears to be increasing with CEO
tenure, which is consistent with standard principal-agent theories. To formally test if
pay-for-performance increases with tenure, consider the null hypothesis H0 : β1 ≥ β2
20χ2 test statistics for null hypothesis that all factor loads are zero is 25.55.
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with an alternative hypothesis H1 : β1 < β2. Notice that,
(β̂2 − β̂1)− (β1 − β2)√
var(β̂2) + 2cov(β̂1, β̂2) + var(β̂2)
∼ tN−K
where N is the number of observations and K is the number of parameters to be esti-
mated. This is a simple one-tail t test. The test statistics is 3.85, thus, null hypothesis
is rejected at any conventional confidence level. The results of Model 2 strongly support
standard principal-agent theories like Gibbons and Murphy’s (1992)
Model 3 separates year effects from tenure effects, thus it is a more general model.
First, let us compare the pay-for-performance parameters for the period between year
1993 and 2000. β11 is the pay-for-performance parameter for shorter tenure, and β21 for
longer tenure. β̂11 is 0.002 with standard error equal to 0.056 while β̂21 is 0.54 with the
standard error equal to 0.100. We reject the null hypothesis H0 : β11 ≥ β21 at 2.5%
confidence level.21 Thus, for the period between year 1993 and 2000, we find strong
evidence that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with tenure.
For the period between year 2000 and 2003, the estimated pay-for-performance pa-
rameters are -0.03 for shorter tenure (β̂12) and 0.16 for longer tenure (β̂22). A negative
estimate for β12 may be counter intuitive, but the magnitude of the coefficient is neg-
ligibly small. Thus pay-for-performance parameters appear to be increasing with CEO
tenure. However, both parameters are rather imprecisely estimated so that null hypoth-
esis, β12 ≥ β22, cannot be rejected at 5% confidence level.
The longer-tenure pay-for-performance parameter for the period between 1993 and
21Test statistics is 4.543.
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2000 (β̂21) is larger than the longer-tenure pay-for-performance parameter for Model 2
(β̂2) by more than 90%. This may indicate possible year effects. In fact, Model 2 is
nested in Model 3 given the restriction of no year effects 22. However, χ2 test statistic is
7.85. Since the critical value for 5% confidence level with degree of freedom 10 is 18.31,
we fail to reject the “no year effects” hypothesis. Therefore, Model 2 becomes the most
relevant for our analysis.
In sum, both Model 2 and Model 3 provides evidence that pay-for-performance
sensitivity increases with CEO tenure. Therefore, our results strongly support standard
principal-agent theories. In addition, existence of “year effects” is rejected, making
Model 2 the most relevant model for our analysis. In the following, we compute the
magnitude of pay-for-performance sensitivity in a more informative way. We base our
analysis on Model 2.
7.3 Magnitudes of pay-for-performance sensitivities.
To interpret the pay-for-performance parameters in a more informative way, we compute
the change in total compensation when firm performance changes from the median level
to the 75th percentile level or to the 25th percentile level. Table 22 shows such results.
First, consider the pay-for-performance sensitivity for shorter tenure. The median level
of total compensation for CEOs at the 4th year of tenure is $2.5 million. The estimation
result, β̂1 = 0.0022, suggests that, starting from the median total compensation, if firm
22More precisely, the restrictions are β11=β12, β21=β2, β31=β32 and β41=β42. To be consistent, we
impose the same “no year effects” restrictions on the initial condition variables. The total number of
constraints is ten.
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performance improves from its median level (0.07) to its 75 percentile level (0.32), total
compensation would increase by $1,500. This is an increase in total compensation of
about 0.06%. If firm performance deteriorates from the median to the 25 percentile
level (-0.17), total compensation decreases by $1,300, which is a 0.05% decrease in total
compensation. This shows that for shorter tenure, pay-for-performance sensitivity is
almost non-existent.
Now consider the pay-for-performance sensitivity for longer tenure. The median
total compensation for CEOs with 10 years of experience is $4 million. Starting at this
level, total compensation increases by $320,000 if firm performance improves from the
median level (0.07) to the 75 percentile level (0.34). This is approximately 8% increase
in total compensation. If firm performance deteriorates from its median level to the
25 percentile level (-0.17), total compensation would decrease by $277,000, which is
a decrease of 6.4%. This result again confirms that pay-for-performance sensitivity is
significantly higher for CEOs with longer tenure, providing strong supporting evidence
for standard principal-agent theories.
7.4 Relationship between incentive and uncertainty about man-
agerial ability of CEOs, and between incentive and risk.
β3 and β4 in Model 2 shows the relationship between the incentive and uncertainty
about a CEO’s managerial ability. Standard principal-agent theories such as Gibbons
and Murphy (1992) predict that both coefficients are positive. As can be seen from
Table 21, we have positive estimates for β3 (coefficient for shorter tenure), but negative
108
estimates for β4 (coefficient for the longer tenure). The magnitude of both coefficients
are quite small as are their standard errors. In fact, if either coefficients are as large
as the upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals (0.01, 0.002), one would be hard
pressed to consider these effects as substantial. For example, consider two CEOs, one
with Years-before-CEO =0 (hired from outside); the other with Years-before-CEO =5
(having worked for the firm for 5 years). Based on the upper bound of 95% confidence
interval for β̂3 (0.01), an improvement in firm performance from the median level to
the 75th percentile level would lead to an 0.06% increase in total compensation for the
CEO with Years-before-CEO=0, while it only leads to 1.5% increase for the CEO with
Years-before-CEO=5.23 Pay-for-performance sensitivity is greater for CEOs with Years-
before-CEO =5 only by 1.46 percentage points. This seems quite small. Therefore, we
find little evidence of the existence of the relationship between incentive and uncertainty
about the CEO’s managerial ability.
β5 shows the relationship between incentive and the riskiness of the environment
in which the firm operates. Although the estimated coefficient is negative as standard
principal-agent theories predict, the estimate is extremely small (-0.05). Even the upper
bound of the 95% confidence interval estimate (0.38) means that the effect of R&D
ratio on the pay-for-performance is almost non-existent: The median and 75 percentile
levels of R&D ratios are 0.001 and 0.035 respectively. When firm performance improves
from the median level to the 75 percentile level, total compensation for a CEO at a
23Change in total compensation is computed assuming that the CEO is at the 4th year of tenure,
having median compensation of $ 2.5 million.
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firm with median R&D increases by 0.06% while total compensation for a CEO at a
firm with 75 percentile level R&D ratio increases by 0.04%. The difference in pay-for-
performance sensitivity is only 0.02 percentage points. Therefore, we find little evidence
of the existence of the relationship between incentive and uncertainty in which the firm
operates.
In sum, the examination of relationships between (a) incentive and the uncertainty
of CEO’s managerial ability, and (b) incentive and risk do not provide further evidence to
support or reject both standard principal-agent theories and our extended-Prendergast
Model.
8 Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to examine the relationship between pay-for-performance
sensitivity and CEO tenure. Using the most recent CEO compensation data, we find
that pay-for-performance sensitivity is significantly greater for CEOs with longer tenure.
For CEOs with tenure between 7 and 11 years, an improvement in firm performance from
the median level to the 75th percentile level would lead to as much as an 8% increase
in total compensation. On the other hand, for CEOs with tenure equal to or fewer 6
years, the same improvement in firm performance only leads to a 0.06% increases total
compensation. Thus, pay-for-performance sensitivity dramatically increases with CEO
tenure. This is a strong support for standard principal-agent theories like Gibbons and
Murphy (1992), but rejects our “extended-Prendergast” model. In addition, we examine
the relationship between incentive and uncertainty about a CEO’s managerial ability,
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and the relationship between incentive and riskiness of the environment in which the
firm operates. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for both relationships are
very small. Such relationships appear to be non-existent or minute at most. Thus, these
two additional tests do not provide further evidence to support or reject both standard
principal-agents theories and our extended-Prendergast model.
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Table 16: Yearly average of total compensation
Year # of obs Average total comp
1993 1330 1.93
1994 1495 2.26
1995 1572 2.21
1996 1639 2.89
1997 1699 3.59
1998 1627 4.09
1999 1653 5.36
2000 1656 6.66
2001 1590 5.91
2002 1575 4.21
2003 1494 3.46
Compensation figures are in million dollars
Table 17: Yearly average of salary, bonuses and options
Year # of obs Salary Bonus Option
1993 1330 0.63 0.50 0.79
1994 1495 0.63 0.55 1.09
1995 1572 0.63 0.56 1.03
1996 1639 0.63 0.67 1.59
1997 1699 0.62 0.66 2.31
1998 1627 0.62 0.65 2.81
1999 1653 0.63 0.75 3.98
2000 1656 0.64 0.78 5.24
2001 1590 0.65 0.67 4.60
2002 1575 0.66 0.70 2.84
2003 1494 0.67 0.83 1.95
Compensation figures are in million dollars
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Table 18: Average exit rate of CEOs by Age
Age of CEOs # of obs Average exit rate
51 150 0.047
52 177 0.045
53 189 0.085
54 198 0.061
55 198 0.111
56 199 0.080
57 195 0.087
58 180 0.1
59 160 0.086
60 136 0.080
61 123 0.146
62 88 0.159
63 63 0.132
64 58 0.379
65 41 0.341
66 22 0.364
67 15 0.333
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Table 19: Choice of explanatory variables
Variables that affect total compensation (Xit) Initial exit variables (Wi)
(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6} log(Market to book asset ratio)t
(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11} (% change in sales)t
(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6} × (years before CEO) (Interlocking directirship
dummy)t
(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11} × (years before CEO) log(Sales)t
(return)it × (R&D Ratio)it ( R&Dassets)t
log(Market to book asset ratio)t−1 Dummy{R&D = 0}t
∆log(market to book asset ratio)t log(stockpricevolatility)t
(Interlocking directirship dummy)t (Y eardummies)t
(Inter locking directorship dummy)t−1 Industry Dummies
CEO Tenure log(dividend yeild+ 1)t
(CEO Tenure)2 (industry average total comp)t
log(sales)t (industry average Option mix)t
log(sales)t−1 Dummies for S&P 500
(% change in sales)t Dummies for S&P Mid cap
(% change in sales)t−1 Years before CEO
( R&D
assets
)t Dummy{(Years before CEO)
is missing}
( R&D
assets
)t−1 (Age)t
(Age)t (Age)
2
t
(Age)2t Dummy{Age over 64}t
Dummy{Ageover64}t 3 years Return to equity
Dummy{R&D = 0}t Number of Board meetings
Dummy{R&D = 0}t−1 Dummy{Age missing}
log(stockpricevolatility)t
log(stockpricevolatility)t−1
Year dummies
(Interlocking Directorship Dummies)t
(Interlocking Directorship Dummies)t−1
log(dividend yeild+ 1)t
log(dividend yeild+ 1)t−1
(industry average total comp)t
(industry average total comp)t−1
(industry average Option mix)t
(industry average Option mix)t−1
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Table 20: Data summary statistics (1993 - 2003)
Variable Mean St div Min Max
Perform 0.35 10.18 -1.0 582.85
R&D
Assets
0.03 0.07 0 1.18
Sales (in $ million) 6.63 18.07 9.4× 10−5 257.16
Age 53.01 6.99 33 81
CEO Tenure 2.9 1.97 1 11
Years before CEO 5.20 9.31 0 46
115
Table 21: Estimation results by models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
β1: ∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6} 0.0022 0.0022 –
(0.00014) (0.018)
β2:∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11} 0.282 0.281 –
(0.188) (0.068)
β11:∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{1993≤year≤2000} – – 0.0022
(0.020)
β12:∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{2001≤year≤2003} – – -0.032
(0.041)
β21: ∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{1993≤year≤2000} – – 0.544
(0.012)
β22: ∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{2001≤year≤2003} – – 0.157
(0.105)
β3: ∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6} 0.005 0.005 –
×(years before CEO) (0.002) (0.0028)
β4:∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6} -0.004 -0.005 –
×(years before CEO) (0.009) (0.007)
β31: ∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{1993≤year≤2000} – – 0.0038
×(years before CEO) (0.003)
β32: ∆(Perform)itI{2≤tenure≤6}I{2001≤year≤2003} – – 0.0097
×(years before CEO) (0.007)
β41: ∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{1993≤year≤2000} – – -0.013
×(years before CEO) (0.013)
β42: ∆(Perform)itI{7≤tenure≤11}I{2000≤year≤2003} – – -0.005
×(years before CEO) (0.023)
β5: ∆(Perform)it × (R&D Ratio)it -0.044 -0.047 -0.020
(0.136) (0.219) (0.526)
ρcomp – 0.069 0.073
(0.045) (0.046)
ρexit – 2.274 5.078
(0.559) (0.502)
ρinit – -13.645 -17.440
(7.520) (22.007)
Inside the brackets are standard errors. For Model 1, they are robust standard errors. Likelihood for
Model 2 is -3403.604. Likelihood for Model 3 is -3399.678.
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Table 22: Magnitudes of Pay-for-performance sensitivity
CEO tenure Change in total Comp Change in total comp
when Perform changes when Perform changes
from the median to from the median to
25th percentile level 25th percentile level
Shorter tenure -$1,300 +$1,500
(4th year of tenure) (-%0.05 change) (+%0.06 change)
Longer tenure -$277,000 +$320,000
(10th year of tenure) (-%6.4 change) (+% 8 change)
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Appendices
A Variable definitions
∆shareholders′wealth =
(firm value)t − (firm value)t−1 + dividend payout
(firm value)t−1
(Market to book asset ratio)t = [Assets− (Total common equity)
+(Share outstanding)× (Share closing price)]
÷Asset
If CEO i is in industry j and number of firms in the industry j at time t is Njt then
(Industry average total comp)it =
1
Njt − 1
∑
s is in industry j, j 6=i
(Total compensation)st
(Industry average Option mix)it =
1
Njt − 1
∑
s is in industry j, j 6=i
(Option mix)st
R&D ratio =
R&D
Assets
Interlocking directorship : This generally involves one of the following situations.
• The officer serves on the board committee that makes his compensation decisions.
• the officer serves on the board (and possibly compensation committee) of another
company that has an executive officer serving on the compensation committee of
the indicated officer’s company.
• the officer serves on the compensation committee of another company that has an
executive officer serving on the board (and possibly compensation committee ) of
the indicated officer’s company.
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Outside succession dummy: This takes the value 1 if the individual is employed by
the firm for 2 years or less prior to becoming an CEO.
B Sample criteria
We treat CEO-firm combination as a unique CEO. If an individual works for two firms,
he or she counts as two CEOs. When a CEO works for multiple firms during the sample
period, two situations can arise. The first case is where the CEO works for multiple firms
at the same time. The second case is where the CEO quits the first firm and moves to
the second, so that there is no overlap in working periods. The first case is likely to
occur due to mergers. To eliminate a possible merger effect in turnover, I drop all the
CEOs that fall under this category. For the second case, I drop the CEOs who worked at
three or more firms, so that in my sample, the number of firms at which each individual
works is at most two. The reason for such elimination is that it is important to keep
some degree of homogeneity in the sample since this is the study of CEO duration.
In addition, we require that for each CEO the observations be of consecutive years;
if any variables are missing in a particular year, all the observations after the first
missing observation are dropped. There are two reasons for this requirement. First, we
want to avoid imputing values for missing observations. Second, missing observations
sometimes occur because a CEO has a “skipped” year, i.e. a situation where a whole
year is missing between the year of the CEO’s first appearance in the sample and the
last year in the sample. This may occur because a CEO leaves the firm and is rehired
later. Requiring the observation to be consecutive eliminates such a possibility, keeping
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some homogeneity in the samples.
Finally, when the CEO exits the firm, it is not necessary that the CEO completes the
last fiscal year. If the CEO complete full 9 months of the fiscal year, we treat the actual
year as the year of separation. For such a case, we compute the full year equivalent
amount of total compensation as (Actual total comp)× 12
Months worked
. If the CEO does
not complete full 9 months, we treat the previous year as the year of separation.
C Proof of proposition 1
Notice that, max{θ1i + ρ1i, i = 1, 2} is the second order statistic of two independent
samples. One of the arguments has distribution (36) and the other has distribution
(37).
We can show that (49) holds. Let Y, Y’ be independent random variables from
N(µ, σ2 + τ 2). We have E[max{Y − µ, Y ′ − µ}] =
√
σ2+τ2
pi
. It suffices to show that
E[max{θ1i + ρ1i, i = 1, 2}]− S1 < E[max{Y − µ, Y ′ − µ}]
We show this in two steps. First, let W and Z be independent random variables
having the distribution functions (36) and (37) respectively. Let V be a random variable
drawn from N(µ, σ2 + τ 2). We have,
E[max{W − S1, Z − S1}] = E[max{θ1i + ρ1i, i = 1, 2}]− S1 (69)
We treat S1 as a constant rather than a random variable at this point. The random
variable V stochastically dominates the random variable Z since P (θi ≤ t|θi + ρ0i ≤
y0) ≥ P (θi ≤ t). This means that E[max{W−S1, V −S1}] also stochastically dominates
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E[max{W − S1, Z − S1}], i.e., E[max{W − S1, V − S1}] ≥ E[max{W − S1, Z − S1}].
Bothmax{W−S1, Z−S1} andmax{Y −µ, Y ′−µ} are the second order statistics of
two independent random variables from non-identical normal distributions. By noticing
that W −S1 has zero mean but lower variance than y−µ and that Z −S1 has the same
variance as Y − µ but lower mean, we can see that 24
E[max{W − S1, V − S1}] < E[max{Y − µ, Y ′ − µ}] (70)
By gathering all the results, we have
E[max{θ1i + ρ1i, i = 1, 2}]− S1 = E[max{W − S1, V − S1}] (71)
≤ E[max{W − S1, V − S1}] < E[max{Y − µ, Y ′ − µ}] (72)
=
√
σ2 + τ 2
pi
(73)
This proves the proposition.
D Proof for proposition 2
The distribution of θti is not normal because of the conditioning sets of the following form,
θsi+ρsi+e
∗ ≤ ys. If all the conditioning sets had the following form θsi+ρsi+e∗ = ys, the
θti would have a normal distribution. Since it is easier to deal with a normal distribution,
we define φti by eliminating the conditioning set of the form,θsi + ρsi + e
∗ ≤ ys from θti.
For example, if
θ3i ∼ [θ1 | θ1 + ρ0i + e∗ = y0, θ1 + ρ1i + e∗ ≤ y1, θ1 + ρ2i + e∗ = y2]
24if X ∼ N(µX , σ2X) and Y ∼ N(µY , σ2Y ), and if X, Y are independent, then E[max{X,Y }] = µΦ( µX−µY√
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
) +
µY Φ(
µY −µX√
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
) +
√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
1√
2pi
exp[− 1
2
(µX−µY )2
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
]. This is increasing in either µX , µY ,σX or σY .
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then
φ3i ∼ [θ1|θ1 + ρ0i + e∗ = y0, θ1 + ρ2i + e∗ = y2]
θti is stochastically dominated by φti. Therefore, we have the following relationship.
E[max{θt1 + ρti, θt2 + ρt2}]−max{E[θt1 + ρt1], E[θt2 + ρt2]}
≤
E[max{φt1 + ρti, φt2 + ρt2}]−max{E[θt1 + ρt1], E[θt2 + ρt2]}
Claim 1: There exist an integer T > 0 such that E[max{φt1+ ρti, φt2+ ρt2}]−max{E[θt1+
ρt1], E[θt2 + ρt2]} <
√
τ2
pi
for all t > T
Proof
Write
At = E[max{φt1 + ρti, φt2 + ρt2}]−max{E[θt1 + ρt1], E[θt2 + ρt2]}
Bt = E[max{φt1 + ρti, φt2 + ρt2}]−max{E[φt1 + ρt1], E[φt2 + ρt2]}
Notice that
E[max{φt1 + ρti, φt2 + ρt2}] (74)
= st1Φ(
st1 − st2√
Q
) + st2Φ(
st2 − st1√
Q
) +
√
Q
1√
2pi
exp[−1
2
(st1 − st2)2
Q
] (75)
where (76)
Q = Ωt1 + Ωt2 + 2τ
2 (77)
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From (75) we can see that 25
E[max{φt1 + ρti, φt2 + ρt2}] < max{st1, st2}+
√
max{Ωt1,Ωt2}+ τ 2
pi
(78)
Therefore, we have
Bt <
√
max{Ωt1,Ωt2}+ τ 2
pi
(79)
→
√
τ 2
pi
as t→∞ (80)
To show (80), we use the fact that max{Ωt1,Ωt2} → 0.
Next, we prove that
|At −Bt| → 0 as t→∞ (81)
To see this, notice that
|At −Bt| = max{E[θt1 + ρt1], E[θt2 + ρt2]} −max{E[φt1 + ρt1], E[φt2 + ρt2]} (82)
Thus, it suffices to show that
E[θt1 + ρt1]− E[φt1 + ρt1] (83)
= |E[θt1]− E[φt1]| → 0 as t → ∞ (84)
To see this, notice that E[θt1] and E[φt1] have the following form.
E[θt1] = E[θ1|Ct, Dt] (85)
E[φt1] = E[θ1|Ct] (86)
25Notice that first two terms of (75) are a convex combination.
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where Ct is the correction of the sets of the following form {θi + ρsi + e∗ = ysi}. Dt is
the collection of the sets of the form, {θi + ρsi + e∗ ≤ ysi} Since E[φt1] → θ1, which is
constant, it is also true that E[θt1]→ θ1. Therefore, (84) holds.
We have shown that At → Bt and that Bt →
√
τ2
pi
. Notice that At = E[max{θ11 +
ρ11, θ12 + ρ12}]− S1. Thus, the proposition is proved.
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